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Thesis Abstract 
 
This study explores the link between vulnerability and participation in international 
negotiations on climate change. Climate change has developed into an urgent, growing problem, 
as it has caused significant destruction to earth’s biodiversity and societies across the world. 
However, the international community has yet to formulate a global plan to successfully combat 
climate change. Therefore, it is imperative to take into account the necessary conditions for 
countries to be more open to negotiating, as only then can the global community reach a 
successful, united plan. Moreover, it is vital to establish a global plan in order to secure the 
health of the planet for future generations and to safeguard the international community which 
faces a variety of challenges that stem from climate change. The question this thesis seeks to 
answer is whether developing countries are likely to participate more actively in international 
and regional negotiations once they actually begin to feel the impacts of climate change. Using a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, I detail three cases: Kenya, Qatar and 
Trinidad and Tobago. The case studies suggest that experiencing considerable vulnerability to 
climate change has indeed motivated developing countries to become more involved in 
international and regional negotiations. However, the perception of vulnerability by itself does 
not mean that a country will be proactive. The securement of financial aid, the desire to attain 
global or regional prestige and leadership, and international pressure are all factors which are 
likely to serve as motivation for involvement as well. Kenya’s high involvement is due to its 
high vulnerability to climate change along with its desire to secure financial aid and achieve 
regional and global prestige. Similarly, high vulnerability, financial aid and the desire to achieve 
prestige and regional leadership contributes to Trinidad and Tobago’s high level of involvement. 
Qatar’s moderate involvement is likely due to the fact that it is ranked much lower in 
vulnerability to climate change and it has only recently begun to feel the impacts of climate 
change. Prestige, regional leadership, international pressure and the spread of environmental 
norms have also motivated Qatar to become more involved. 
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CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION 
This study will explore the link between vulnerability and participation in international  
negotiations on climate change. Focusing on the most recent international climate change  
negotiations, I will look to see what possible circumstances could motivate developing countries  
to play a larger role in negotiations. This thesis will review negotiations starting from 2009 to  
2013: the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, the 2010 Cancun Agreements, the 2011 Durban outcomes,  
the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway and a set of decisions agreed at the 2013 conference in Warsaw.  
Though these negotiations have been underway for some time, an agreement on measures to  
mitigate the climate change problem has yet to be made. 
 Global climate change presents one of the most significant threats facing the world today.  
Major environmental degradation spurred by climate change has occurred in regions and  
societies across the globe. Scientists have discovered that climate change is the central cause of  
the destruction of the Earth’s biodiversity. The increasing natural and man-made destruction of  
the Earth’s environment has produced harmful effects that threaten populations and habitats  
globally.
1
 
 As concern surrounding Earth’s warming climate grew, the first major international  
meeting, the World Climate Conference, was set up in 1979 to address the rising concern of  
climate change. Later on, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
(UNFCCC) was created in 1992. This global treaty was created in an effort for countries to  
cooperatively consider what they could do to limit average global temperature increases and the  
resulting climate change. The treaty also served as a means for countries to manage how they  
would deal with climatic impacts that were foreseeable in the future.
2
  
                                                 
1 “Climate Change Will Cause Widespread Global-Scale Loss of Common Plants and Animals, Researchers 
Predict.” Science Daily, (2013), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130512140946.htm.  
 
2
. “Essential Background,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed February 4, 2014, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php.  
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Soon after, the UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol in an effort to control greenhouse  
gas emissions. The Protocol entered into force in 2005 and served as an international agreement  
which commits its Parties by setting internationally binding emission reduction targets.
3
 The  
Kyoto Protocol was established after a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
(IPCC) concluded that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are very likely  
responsible for most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid- 
20th century.
4
 Hence, the Protocol's main feature is to instill mandatory targets for greenhouse  
gas emissions for the world’s leading economies which have accepted it.5 So far, the worlds  
leading economies have refused to participate in the agreements, yet are among the world’s   
highest greenhouse gas emitters. Moreover, developing countries were not obliged to lower  
greenhouse gas emissions under the agreement so as to not deter their economic development  
and progress. Since the agreement left out the major players that are in fact contributing to global  
climate change, cooperation within the international community to reduce greenhouse gas  
emissions could, at most, achieve only limited success. As a result, the Kyoto Protocol fell short  
of acting as an effective framework for addressing global warming.
6
 
 
Since 2009, international negotiations have been conducted in an attempt to take up  
where the Kyoto Protocol left off and move forward with discussing new climate change  
mitigation efforts. In November 2011, the International Energy Agency warned that the world  
may be fast approaching a tipping point concerning climate change, and suggested that the next  
five years will be crucial for greenhouse gas reduction efforts.
7
 Humans produce greenhouse  
                                                 
 3 “Kyoto Protocol” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed on February 4, 2014, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.  
 
4
 “Understanding and Attributing Climate Change - AR4 WGI Summary for Policymakers” Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, accessed on February 5, 2014, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/spmsspm-understanding-and.html.  
 
5
 “Kyoto Protocol” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
6 Hiroji Hizosaki, “Japan: Achieving its Kyoto Target” Crucial Issues in Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol: 
Asia and the World.” World Scientific Publishing Co., (2010), p. 383. 
7“The Global Climate Change Regime, Scope of the Challenge” Council on Foreign Relations, (June 9, 2013). 
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gases by burning coal, oil, and natural gas to generate energy for power, heat, industry, and  
transportation. Deforestation and agricultural activity also yield climate-changing emissions.  
Avoiding the worst consequences of climate change will require large cuts in global greenhouse  
gas emissions.
8 
 
As high per-capita GDP correlates strongly with high per-capita emissions,  
and no large country has ever experienced lasting economic growth without simultaneously  
increasing emissions, it is perhaps not surprising that more than thirty years have passed since  
the first World Climate Conference and fifteen years have passed since the United Nations  
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into force. Still, no global plan  
to reduce emissions has been successfully formulated by the international community. As  
international negotiations continue, it is apparent that measures to reduce global greenhouse gas  
emissions will require full international participation and substantial financial cost.
  
 
This topic was selected for three reasons: First, the environment is a crucial matter  
to research, as scientific evidence has revealed that without significant action taken now, the  
warming climate will continue to unleash harsh threats upon the planet and societies now and in  
the future. Second, as climate change presents a problem that affects the entire world, it is crucial  
to investigate the several components that have caused the past failure of collective action among  
countries in order to find new and improved mechanisms that will promote international  
collaboration. Third, the international community continues to face several other significant  
problems which are connected to climate change, and without successful negotiation of climate  
change mitigation, these problems are very likely to persist.  
 I have chosen to focus in particular on smaller developing countries because while much  
attention has been focused on the responsibilities and concerns of developed countries as well as  
the advanced developing countries, not so much is known about the rest of the world. All nations  
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
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are suffering from the effect of climate change. My question is: do these smaller countries also  
feel the urgency of participating fully in climate change negotiations and if so, why?  
The subsequent chapters will address the research design and theoretical literature 
 
followed by a review of recent international negotiations on climate change, case analysis, and  
 
an assessment and conclusion which will communicate my findings.
8 
 
CHAPTER 2-RESEARCH DESIGN &LITERATURE 
 
 
Research Design 
 
  As opposed to the attention paid to developed and advanced developing countries, little  
 
attention has been paid to less advanced developing countries on the issue of climate change and  
 
the ongoing international negotiations. There has been a divide in climate change negotiations  
 
between developed and advanced developing countries, and the less advanced developing  
 
countries have not gained as much attention as their larger counterparts.
1
 However, the  
 
environmental health of the world depends on all nations. Traditionally, developing countries  
 
have been concerned with development rather than the environment, and so it has taken some  
 
time for them to come to prioritizing environmental issues. These countries are an important part  
 
of the process; most importantly, the majority of these countries have been directly affected by  
 
the harmful effects of climate change even though most of them pollute the least. Thus, some of  
 
these countries are highly vulnerable and are at great risk of harmful environmental occurrences  
 
as the climate continues to change.
2
 Moreover, high vulnerability to climate change has  
 
prevented these countries from developing to their fullest potential, thus it is in their self-interest  
 
to be proactive on environmental matters.  For these reasons, it is important to consider the  
 
conditions that may enhance their involvement in international negotiations.  
  
 “Climate change vulnerability” is a term that will be used to characterize the focus of this  
 
study, as all countries are in danger. The definition of climate change vulnerability, taken from  
 
                                                 
 
1
 Bradley C Parks and J Timmons Roberts. “Inequality and the Global Climate Regime: Breaking the North-South 
Impasse.” Centre of International Studies, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 21, no. 4 (2008): 621–
22.  
 
2
 “Press Conference by Alliance of Small Island States on Climate Change | Meetings Coverage and Press 
Releases.” United Nations, (2009), http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/090710_AOSIS.doc.htm.  
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the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Second Assessment Report, is, “The extent to  
 
which climate change may damage or harm a particular system as well as its ability to adapt to  
 
new climatic conditions.”3  
 
 My hypothesis is that only when developing countries actually begin to feel the impacts  
 
of climate change are they likely to participate actively in international and regional negotiations.  
 
Some of these countries are strategizing as regions, some individually, and almost all have  
 
entered into global discussions but some are more active then others. I will attempt to support my  
 
hypothesis by examining three types of countries: (1) countries dependent on agricultural  
 
exports, because these countries rely largely on arable land and agricultural output for economic  
 
stability, but agriculture has been significantly threatened by climate change; (2) hydrocarbon  
 
economies, because these countries rely heavily on the utilization of fossil fuels for the  
 
production of energy, yet these processes, which emit large amounts of carbon dioxide, are  
 
harmful to the environment and have exacerbated climate change; and (3) Small Island  
 
Developing States (SIDS), because these countries face inherent challenges to climate change,  
 
mainly the danger of significant sea-level rise.  
 
  I will select one country from each group to determine what their positions have been on  
 
the climate change issue across time as reflected in their involvement in the global talks. The  
 
countries selected are Kenya, a country dependent on agricultural exports; Qatar, a hydrocarbon  
 
economy; and Trinidad and Tobago, a small island developing state. These countries are at  
 
varying levels of development and face a broad range of different problems stemming from  
 
climate change.
4
 I have declined to choose the really large developing countries, such as China,  
                                                 
3   “IPCC Second Assessment-Climate Change 1995” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), p. 28, 
http://ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-1995/ipcc-2nd-assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf.  
 4 “Executive Summary,” Center for International Earth Science Information Network, accessed on February 4, 
2014, http://www.ciesin.org/docs/003-079/execsummary.html.  
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India and Brazil because a lot of attention is focused on them and not enough on less advanced  
 
developing countries.  
 
 I am proposing that their participation in international climate change negotiations is  
 
related to the perception of climate change vulnerability, the independent variable included in  
 
this study. In general, developing countries like the ones I have selected are beginning to feel the  
 
impacts of climate change, and as a result, it is vital for them to be included in international  
 
negotiations. Less developed countries like Kenya do not have the economic or financial power  
 
to mitigate harsh climatic effects and are lower in economic status compared to the rest of the  
 
world. Furthermore, these countries have not yet developed a scientific establishment on the  
 
issue of climate change, as compared to richer regions like North America, which can look past  
 
the material aspects of development. In some ways, the environment has been seen as a luxury to  
 
the developing world, which is still focused heavily on development and is not as focused as  
 
developed countries in regards to establishing solid scientific research on the environment.
5
  
 
Nonetheless, the participation of all developing countries in negotiations is crucial to combating  
 
climate change, not only domestically but as a worldwide phenomenon. Thus, my hypothesis  
 
rests on one assumption: I assume that developing countries in which people are able to observe  
 
the physical destruction of their environment and face the challenges of adapting to new climatic  
 
conditions are likely to become proactive in negotiations.  
 
 To measure my independent variable, I will use the climate change vulnerability  
 
index (CCVI) developed by the global risk advisory firm Maplecroft to measure vulnerability for  
 
each country. For my dependent variable, I will review the performance of each country in recent  
 
                                                 
 5 “Agenda 21 – Science For Sustainable Development” United Nations Environment Programme, accessed on 
February 2, 2014, http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?DocumentID=52&ArticleID=85&l=en.  
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international climate change negotiations from 2009 to 2013. This will include negotiations on  
 
the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, the 2010 Cancun Agreements, the 2011 Durban outcomes, the  
 
2012 Doha Climate Gateway and a set of decisions agreed at the 2013 conference in Warsaw.  
 
Also included are any other notable regional negotiations but not the 64
th
 Session of the UN  
 
General Assembly which was devoted to climate change and which was attended by all  
 
countries, with almost all sending high-level delegates. I will determine involvement by  
 
observing the following five categories: (1) how many negotiating sessions did they attend?; 
 
(2) how many delegates did they send to the five main sessions? (I omit the regional sessions  
 
where delegate attendance tends to be high); (3) what was the proportion of high level delegates?  
 
(high-level delegates include presidents, prime ministers, ambassadors, members of parliament,  
 
permanent secretaries and directors of key agencies); (4) the number of times, if any, the country  
 
spoke at these sessions; (5) the number of times, if any, the country presented a unique proposal;  
 
and (6) whether the country led, advocated or sponsored proposals on behalf of other  
 
developing countries. (If so, the country will receive one extra point for each time it did so.) 
 
 As I observe the second category, I will take into account two underlying issues: the  
 
large disparity in population size among my case studies and the fact that Qatar, one of the three  
 
countries selected, hosted the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway, one of the five negotiations  
 
discussed. To deal with the first issue, a scale will be created. For each case, I will pick three  
 
other countries which are similar in terms of wealth and population. For these three other  
 
countries, I will average the number of delegates that attended the 2009-2013 climate change  
 
negotiations. I will then compare the average number of delegates to Kenya’s, Qatar’s, and  
 
Trinidad and Tobago’s delegation count and rank their representation as above the average of the  
 
three similar countries, average, or below average. If the delegate count was 25 or more above  
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the average, I will give the country 10 points; if it was 10-25 above, 8 points; less than 10 above  
 
or below average, 5 points; and more than that below average only 2 points. With respect to the  
 
level of representation, I will divide the number of high-level delegates by the full delegation to  
 
get a percentage. If a country has a percentage of high-level representation between 35-50, I will  
 
give it 20 points; if a country has a percentage of high-level representation between 20-34, I will  
 
give it 10 points; and if a country has a percentage of high-level representation of 19 and below,  
 
I will give it 5 points. Some adjustments will be made if countries score on the cusp.  
 
Additionally, since Qatar hosted the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway, their delegation was  
 
inflated at this meeting and thus does not match what would illustrate their normal representation  
 
at conferences. To deal with this issue, I will cancel out their actual delegate count at the 2012  
 
Doha Climate Gateway and implement a “dummy” variable, which will be developed by  
 
assessing their average delegation count taken at the other four negotiations. In this way, Qatar  
 
will be given a number for the Doha conference similar to their delegate count at the other  
 
conferences and there will be no disparity in my analysis. 
 
To measure the total country score on participation, a scale will then be devised ranging  
 
from 0 to 50. The ceiling of 50 seemed to be appropriate because earlier research suggested that  
 
most countries would score well below that. Depending on how many total points each country  
 
receives, according to the above categories, scores between 0-10 will receive a D grade, scores  
 
between 11-20 will receive a C grade, scores between 21-30 will receive a B grade, scores  
 
between 31-40 will receive an A grade, and scores between 41-50 will receive an A plus. The  
 
scale can be interpreted as follows: A D grade indicates zero or low participation; a C grade  
 
indicates moderately low participation; a B grade indicates moderately high participation; an A  
 
grade indicates very high participation; and an A plus indicates exceptional participation. After  
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analyzing the score, which will give me a sense of the countries’ commitment, I will then enter  
 
into a more nuanced qualitative discussion in which I will investigate reasons for performance. I  
 
will try to identify whether vulnerability relates to performance, or if there are any other  
 
conditions that could motivate developing countries to actively join climate change negotiations. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Climate Change as a Complex Issue 
 
 The issue of uncertainty surrounding climate change is a major theme discussed  
 
by scholars, who have found that the warming of the earth’s climate is a “creeping”  
 
environmental problem which includes long-term hazards and slow-onset, cumulative processes  
 
that ultimately can result in crises or disasters.  Since there are enormous time lags in the  
 
changing climate, there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding climate change as it is hard to measure  
 
and predict. As a result, these challenges make climate change a complex and difficult issue for  
 
the international community to manage and collectively act on.
6
 With that said, a plethora of  
 
literature discusses how the large divide between the developed and the developing world has  
 
caused climate change to be a problematic environmental issue for the international community  
 
to tackle. The developed world holds the most global political influence and generally has more  
 
options when dealing with the effects of climate change. Advanced developing countries are also  
 
influential in their own way, but they differ from developed nations in pressing for more gradual  
 
concessions. Meanwhile, some small developing nations, which have less say on the issue, face  
 
severe impacts of climate change such as deforestation, water poverty, erratic weather patterns,  
 
air pollution and vegetation loss.
7
 
                                                 
6 Susanne C. Moser and Lisa Dilling. “Making Climate Hot: Communicating the Urgency and Challenge of Global 
Climate Change.” Environment, 46, no. 10, Heldref Publications, (2004) p. 34. 
7 Ibid, p. 35. 
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 Negotiations on emission reduction among countries are increasingly fraught with  
 
difficulty, partly because of arguments about the responsibility for the ongoing temperature rise.
8
  
 
The global divide makes it difficult for the international community to negotiate an agreement on  
 
climate change mitigation yet reinforces the need for developing countries to participate in  
 
negotiations. Scholars discuss the importance of including developing nations in international  
 
talks, contending that any attempt to control global C02 emissions must ultimately include them,  
 
as well as all nations.
9
  
 
 
Two-level Games:  The Domestic and International Level 
 Robert Putnam’s two-level game analysis can be used to understand international  
 
negotiations on climate change and the ways in which the domestic level is significant to  
 
international negotiations.  According to Putnam, the two-level game operates between the  
 
domestic level and international level. At the domestic level, domestic groups put pressure on  
 
governments to adopt favored policies. Domestic coalitions hold great bargaining power and  
 
therefore will influence the acceptability of an agreement.
 10
 When applying this to climate  
 
change negotiations, it means that it is vital that the international community considers  
 
conditions that will be favorable to the national level so domestic needs of countries are met.  
 
Achieving domestic approval is a top priority, as an international agreement cannot move  
 
forward if this is not met.
  
 
Developing countries are beginning to suffer greatly from climate change. Among these  
 
                                                 
8 Ting Wei et al. “Developed and Developing World Responsibilities for Historical Climate Change and CO2 
Mitigation.” National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America, Vol. 109, no. 32 (2012): p. 12911.  
9 Chen Gang. “The Kyoto Protocol and the Logic of Collective Action,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 
Vol. 1, (2007) p. 528. 
10 Robert D.  Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” International 
Organization.  MIT Press Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), 434. 
15 
 
countries, the physical environments are visibly damaged by climatic impacts, thus, various  
 
domestic sectors are affected such as a country’s rural, agricultural and tourism sectors.  
 
Furthermore, as some of these countries do not have the financial means to protect themselves  
 
against harsh environmental effects, this further exacerbates the physical and social toll climate  
 
change can produce. Putnam’s analysis highlights the significance of fulfilling the needs of  
 
domestic parties. His analysis further illustrates that the decision to be proactive in climate  
 
change negotiations rests with actors at the domestic level. 
 
Liberalism, Constructivism and the International Environmental Regime: Fostering 
Cooperation 
 Liberalists tend to see international relations as facilitating cooperation. They believe that 
states can overcome conflict through the pacifying influence of economic interdependence, 
international institutions and the spread of liberal democratic political systems.
11
 In fact, 
liberalists argue that international organizations, institutions and regimes have a measurable 
impact on global relations and the behavior of states. Regimes, like the environmental regime, 
are instances of international cooperation. A regime is defined as “Government arrangements 
constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of international 
behavior in various issue areas. Regimes thus comprise a normative element, state practice, and 
organizational roles.”12 
 The environmental regime includes several organizations and international institutions 
which have a large influence on state behavior and foreign policies with respect to climate 
                                                 
11 Benjamin Habib. Climate Change and the International Relations Theory: Northeast Asia as a Case Study. Third 
Global International Studies Conference, Porto, Portugal: University of Porto, Portugal, (2011), p. 14. Accessed on 
February 20, 2014. http://www.wiscnetwork.org/porto2011/papers/WISC_2011-562.pdf. 
12 Frederick Kratochwill and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A state of the Art on an Art of the 
State,” International Organization 40 (1986): 753, 759. 
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change mitigation. For instance, The United Nations is a major international organization that 
has been instrumental in developing international legal frameworks for biodiversity conservation 
and climate change. One of the most influential bodies that have been formed to address climate 
change is the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which was established in 
1988 by the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization.
13
  It functioned as a scientific intergovernmental body to provide decision makers 
with an assessment of the latest scientific research and its policy implications for mitigation and 
adaptation.  The IPCC worked diligently to review the outpouring of findings made by scientists 
from all around the world and to assess human impact on the environment.
14
 For instance, the 
IPCC has published five assessments on global warming since 1990.
15
 As of 2014, the IPCC has 
three Working Groups and a Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.
16
 These 
Working Groups were developed to report on available scientific information on climate change 
as well as the environmental and socio-economic impacts of climate change over both the short 
and long term. For each report, the Working Groups have provided new knowledge and 
improved understanding of the climate processes. In addition, they have developed response 
strategies and have worked to broaden the scope of their assessment to include information on 
the technical and economic feasibility of a range of potential adaptation and mitigation 
strategies.
17
 Overall, The IPCC represents a unique partnership between the scientific community 
and the world’s governments. 18 
                                                 
13“Understanding Climate Change: 22 years of IPCC Assessment” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) (November, 2010), p. 4. 
14 Linda Fasulo. An Insider’s Guide to the UN. 2nd Ed. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press; 2nd 
edition, (2009) p. 133. 
15 IPCC “Understanding Climate Change: 22 years of IPCC Assessment,” p. 5. 
16 Ibid, p. 1. 
17 Ibid, pp. 4-6. 
18 Ibid, p. 2. 
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 Another major institution devoted to environmental issues is the UN General Assembly, 
which has sponsored major international environmental conferences and has played a vital role 
in advocating attention to climate change.
19
 Furthermore, The United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP), is another intergovernmental organization which has served as an 
“institutional hub” for the UN’s many environmental initiatives.20 UNEP is not designed to 
actually develop policy, but rather, to direct negotiation and implementation on environmental 
issues by providing expertise and knowledge.
21
 Finally, two international financial institutions, 
the World Bank and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), have helped finance various 
climate change initiatives. While the World Bank has supported sustainable projects,
22
 the GEF 
has emerged as a largely independent and primary source of funding for multilateral 
environmental agreements, which include funding the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its various accords and protocols.
23
 As liberalists note, the 
environmental regime centers on policies and agreements linked to climate change mitigation. 
Several international institutions have contributed significantly to scientific research, holding 
international conferences and promoting and enforcing international cooperation on climate 
change mitigation.  
 Though cooperation can be advanced through international institutions, it is important to 
note that there are existing barriers to cooperation including the complexity and novelty of the 
problem itself, which have hindered the adoption of an adequate solution. Nations throughout the 
world experience a range of various environmental risks, as some experience the worst effects 
                                                 
19 Marvin Soroos, “Global Institutions and the Environment.” Global Environment: Institutions, Law, and Policy. 
(2011) Washington DC: CQ Press. pp. 31-32.  
20 Ibid, p. 33. 
21  Andresen, Steinar and Kristin Rosendal. 2009. “The Role of the United Nations Environment Programme in the 
Coordination of Multilateral Environmental Agreements.” In International Organizations in Global Environmental 
Governance, London: Routledge, p. 135. 
22 Marvin Soroos, “Global Institutions and the Environment,” p. 59. 
23 Ibid, p. 43. 
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while others may actually benefit from a warmer climate. Nonetheless, despite these differences 
and challenges, all nations should share the common interest in avoiding catastrophic effects 
from climate change; therefore there is an overall aim for the global community to achieve 
cooperation.
24
 
  Neoliberal institutionalism further explains the challenges and benefits of cooperation, as 
it focuses mainly on how cooperation is achieved in the world. Robert Keohane, a firm advocate 
of neoliberal institutionalism, has noted under this theory that cooperation is hard to achieve, but, 
regimes, like the environmental regime and its institutions, could benefit states by incorporating 
cooperative strategies. Keohane defines cooperation as a process whereby states, “adjust their 
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy 
coordination” 25 Furthermore, according to political scientist John Ruggie, regimes are “a set of 
mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial 
commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.”26 As illustrated through the 
environmental regime, neoliberal institutionalism argues that states pursue such policies because 
it is usually in the best interest of all involved to do so. 
  The constructivist framework emphasizes the value of beliefs and ideology, and has 
stressed the role of non-state actors more than other IR approaches. For example, scholars have 
made note of the role of transnational actors such as NGOs or transnational corporations in 
changing state beliefs about foreign policy. Such “norm entrepreneurs” are able to influence state 
behavior through rhetoric or other forms of lobbying, persuasion, and shaming.
27
 The social 
                                                 
24 Jeremiah Collins. “Assessing International Cooperation on Climate Change: A Neoliberal Analysis of the 
Effectiveness of Formal International Environmental Institutions,” Mapping Politics, 4 (2012) p. 3-4. 
25 Robert O. Keohane. “Chapter 4 Cooperation and International Regimes.” In After Hegemony Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy, 51.Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
26 Ibid, 57.  
27 ME Keck and K Sikkink “Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics” (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca (1998). 
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construction of the actors’ identities and interests, and of structures such as discourses and norms 
is at the core of constructivism.
28
 This is reflected in the interests and identities of climate change 
actors such as the individuals, sub-state actors, states and international organizations which have 
emerged in climate change negotiations.
29
  
 Social scientists have progressively adopted constructivism to understand environmental 
issues. Constructivists hold that social facts are real because they have material consequences 
and material consequences are real by virtue of social construction.
30
 Constructivists maintain 
that the material and ideational are complexly intertwined and interdependent.
31
 Thus, any study 
of climate change must give value to both.  This approach contributes to the understanding of 
how material realities gain meaning through social interaction. Accordingly, interpretations of 
climate change are shaped by social and material forces.
32
 
  The social construction of climate change in political science, specifically how politics 
have been incorporated into the science of climate change, is illustrated in recent literature. 
Through reviewing the history of climate modeling and several scientific controversies, author 
David Demeritt reveals the implicit social and epistemic commitments implied by its particular 
practices. The scientific framing of global climate change has reinforced, and has been 
reinforced, by how technical experts, governments and scientists have managed the issue. For 
                                                 
 28 Mary E. Pettenger. “Chapter 1 Introduction: Power, Knowledge and the Social Construction of Climate Change.” 
In The Social Construction of Climate Change, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., (2007) p. 6.  
29 Ibid, p. 7. 
30
 Pettenger, p. 6. 
31 Colin Hay, “The WSCR Archive: What Place for Ideas in the Structure-Agency Debate? Globalisation as a 
“Process Without a Subject.” The Website for Critical Realism. First Press: Writing in the Critical Social Sciences 
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32 Pettenger, p. 6. 
20 
 
example, we can look at how the scientific construction of climate change was developed 
through the scientific discovery of the harsh effects greenhouse gases have on the atmosphere.
33
  
Through a constructivist lens, the social definitions of climate change can be examined and seen 
as a threat or an opportunity.
34
 In this respect, the social knowledge of climate change and the 
existing distrust of the science that surrounds it raises important questions about trust, 
uncertainty, and expertise.
35
  
Why States Resist or Cooperate 
I. Realism 
 In contrast to liberalists, realists would assert that states interests are defined in terms of  
power and each state wishes to dominate in the anarchical international system. Under realism,  
all nations are distrustful and would not normally cooperate because this would be against their  
top priority of self-interest and goal of power preservation and maximization.
36
 Furthermore,  
under realism, states must constantly ensure that they have sufficient power to defend themselves  
and advance their material interests necessary for survival.
37
 With that said, the past failure of  
states to collectively act to find a solution to the climate change problem can be illustrated under  
this theory. Global efforts to reduce the adverse effects of climate change requires countries to  
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to safe levels and adopt alternative environmentally-friendly  
technologies. However, the international community has not developed a unified solution  
regarding global mitigation efforts because reducing capabilities required for climate change  
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mitigation threatens the economic development of a country, and in turn, disrupts the goal of  
power maximization. For example, energy and food security are all vital to a country’s survival  
and makes them feel powerful, thus they will likely want to develop capabilities, such as  
agricultural and industrial practices, in order to preserve and enhance their economic  
development. As a result, cooperation is not likely to happen. Furthermore, given the existing  
distrust of science surrounding the evolution of climate change, there is the notion that states  
may perceive that implementing efforts to mitigate climate change is a plot to get them to stop  
developing. In this case, international collaboration is unlikely to occur and the climate change  
problem will not be resolved. 
II. Compliance 
 The international climate change regime has existing and emerging compliance systems. 
The literature discusses how international climate change compliance mechanisms are 
undergoing a period of considerable change and uncertainty as the shape and direction of 
international climate change obligations are being transformed. This transformation includes a 
shift towards increased parallelism between developing and developed countries in terms of 
targets and a more limited range for a Kyoto Protocol-style compliance mechanism. In other 
words, rather than holding only industrialized countries responsible for meeting targets on 
emission emitting, a larger range of countries will bear the responsibility to meet emission 
reduction targets.
38
 
Many small countries are being pressured by the developed nations to adhere to 
environmental standards. Scholar Jeanne Hey acknowledges the many ways in which 
dependency influences foreign policy. According to Hey, states that are economically dependent 
on powerful nations, otherwise known as the core, will either align their foreign policies with 
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22 
 
those of the core or go against them. Hey discusses four categories of behavior between the core 
and the periphery states that can further explain this idea: compliance, consensus, counter-
dependence and compensation. When the periphery, or the weaker state, shapes its foreign 
policies against the requests of the core state, the periphery can face a lot of military or economic 
sanctions from the core state as a result. Thus, it is likely that the periphery will seek to align 
themselves with the core state to avoid punishment.
39
 
 Hey cites Bruce Moon to explain that through compliance and consensus, the foreign 
policy outcomes of dependent states will be aligned with the preferences of the core. Under 
compliance, the dependent state will consider the core’s wishes regarding foreign policy 
decisions in order to be rewarded or not to be punished.
40
 Furthermore, the core’s economic 
authority can be used to achieve a particular foreign policy behavior from the dependent nation. 
Executing this strategy depends on the level of autonomy of the periphery state.  Analysts have 
looked at two political perspectives in assessing the relationship between domestic and foreign 
policy. The first includes the application of an elite attitudinal approach to assess values and 
ideologies of decision makers, while the second looks at the domestic, state, class, and social and 
external forces to help explain the level of autonomy in determining a state’s potential of 
counter-dependency policy-making.
41
 
 Hey’s work can be applied to the conduct of dependent states in the context of  
 
climate change. As illustrated in past climate change negotiations, the powerful influence that  
 
developed countries have exerted on small developing countries has influenced their behavior in  
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some instances. Dependent countries have agreed to international climate change agreements in  
 
order to be rewarded with financial support and to avoid punishment, and they also at times have  
 
been pressured to join these agreements by more powerful countries.  
 
There are benefits as well: research suggests that through international assistance, the  
 
economic and social conditions in developing countries can be strengthened, which in turn can  
 
influence and improve domestic policymaking on climate change mitigation.
42
 In particular,  
 
countries can largely benefit from programs that are developed to encourage and train  
 
communities in engaging in sustainability practices. These programs can also educate citizens  
 
and enforce capacity building to improve policies in climate change mitigation and to reduce  
 
economic vulnerability.  
 
 In the next chapter, I will provide some background on the five major conferences on  
 
climate change which are the focus on this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3-BACKGROUND ON INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, 2009-2013 
 
The 2009 Copenhagen Accord 
In an effort to strengthen the global response to climate change, a United Nations  
conference known as the Copenhagen Summit was held in Copenhagen, Denmark in December,  
2009. The Kyoto Protocol—an international agreement which went into force in 2005 which  
commits its Parties by setting internationally binding emission reduction targets
1—failed in  
many respects to properly combat and mitigate climate change on a global scale.
2
 As a result, the  
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—an international treaty  
established in 1992 to limit average global temperature increases and the resulting climate  
change
3—held the Copenhagen Summit with the aim of providing legal and political direction  
with respect to the future of the international climate regime after 2012.  
According to the UNFCCC, the Summit was held in accordance with the 2007 Bali  
Roadmap, which was adopted at the UNFCCC’s 2007 conference on climate change in Bali,  
Indonesia. The Bali Roadmap consists of several decisions that represent the many paths needed  
to reach a secure climate future, including deforestation and forest management, technology for  
developing countries, the establishment of an Adaptation Fund Board and a review of the  
financial mechanism.
4 The Bali Road Map includes the Bali Action Plan, which plotted the  
course for a new negotiating process intended to tackle climate change by 2009. Core elements  
of the Bali Action Plan include the long-term goal for mitigation, adaptation, finance,  
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technology, forests and measurement, reporting and verification.
5
  
The Copenhagen Accord called for limits on temperature increases to two degrees  
Celsius above preindustrial levels on the “basis of equity and in the context of sustainable  
development” and for “deep cuts in global emissions” and the peaking of global and national  
emissions.
6
 Furthermore, according to the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, the main  
features of the Copenhagen Accord include, “A process for countries to enter their specific  
mitigation pledges by January 31, 2010; broad terms for the reporting and verification of  
countries’ actions; a collective commitment by developed countries for $30 billion in ‘new and  
additional’ resources in 2010-2012 to help developing countries reduce emissions; preserve  
forests and a goal of mobilizing $100 billion a year in public and private finance by 2020 to  
address developing county needs.”7 The accord also called for the establishment of a  
Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, a mechanism to transfer money to better assist developing  
countries in climate change mitigation, a High Level Panel to examine ways of meeting the 2020  
finance goal, a new Technology Mechanism, and a mechanism to channel incentives for reduced  
deforestation.”8 
The Copenhagen Summit failed in many ways, particularly from a legal and political  
perspective. The provisions of the accord did not give a specific time frame for the limit of the  
global temperature increase to two degrees Celsius. Furthermore, the accord did not specify  
which countries must cut emissions nor did it specify by when. Thus, this left developed nations  
free to continue emitting, as there were no set time-bound targets for emission reductions from  
industrialized countries. Because the accord rested on a voluntary and domestic target for  
emission reduction, it lacked powerful rules and procedures for the international community to  
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adopt to mitigate climate change.
9
 
The divide between the developed and the developing world was apparent at the Summit.  
Developing countries did not receive what they wanted in terms of financial assistance and  
developed countries did not agree to binding mitigation commitments. Thus, developing  
countries were forced to settle for what developed countries were offering, since they would only  
acquire the funding if they were to agree with the accord. This meant that if they were to not  
agree with the accord, they would not receive any funding for climate change mitigation. This  
put developing countries in a problematic position, as they felt that none of these options truly  
worked to their benefit to assist them in adapting and alleviating the harsh climatic conditions  
that they were experiencing.  Furthermore, developing countries were put under significant  
amount of economic and external political pressure to endorse the accord. As a result, they  
decided to join partly because they wanted to get what they could out of the funding in order to  
alleviate the dire climatic impacts they were facing. Overall, the Accord failed to significantly  
protect developing countries from climate change. The Summit left these countries questioning  
the prospects for significant further progress within an international U.N. negotiation process.
10
 
 
The 2010 Cancun Agreements 
The Cancun Agreements, reached on December 11 in Cancun, Mexico, at the 2010  
United Nations Climate Change Conference, were a set of significant decisions made by the  
international community to address the long-term challenge of climate change collectively and  
comprehensively over time and to take concrete action to speed up the global response. The  
agreements established objectives for reducing human-generated greenhouse gas emissions over  
time to keep the global average temperature rise below two degrees Celsius and encouraged the  
participation of all countries in reducing these emissions, in accordance with each country’s  
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different responsibilities and capabilities to do so. In addition, the agreements aimed to mobilize  
the development and transfer of clean technology to boost efforts to address climate change and  
provide for scaled-up funds in the short and long term to enable developing countries to take  
greater and effective action.
11
 
 Unlike the Copenhagen Accord, the Agreements particularly aimed to assist vulnerable  
countries in adapting to the inevitable impacts of climate change, as well as to protect the  
world’s forests and build up global capacity, especially in developing countries, to meet the  
overall challenge.
12
 Although the Cancun Conference did produce voluntary commitments from  
the most important developed and developing nations, these commitments left at the very  
minimum “a five gigatonne gap between emissions levels that will only be achieved if there is  
full compliance with the voluntary emissions reductions and what is necessary to prevent a two  
degrees Celsius rise.” 13 
Most participants in the conference acknowledged that these provisions were not enough  
to combat climate change. Although the accord required developed countries to submit and  
implement mitigation actions, it did not suggest a cumulative quantitative mitigation goal. This  
left developing countries unhappy for the most part.
14
 Moreover, its provision to limit the  
temperature to two degrees Celsius did not sit well with small-island developing countries as  
groups like the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) had been advocating for a limit of 1.5  
degrees Celsius,
15
 after most scientists believed that even a two degrees Celsius temperature rise  
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Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (December 
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could cause very dangerous climate change. However, it was an amount that had been adopted as  
the ultimate goal of the UNFCCC.
16
 
 
The 2011 Durban Outcomes 
According to the Doha Carbon and Energy Forum 2013, a Briefing Paper on climate  
change, the Durban negotiations resulted in the establishment of a second commitment period  
under the Kyoto Protocol from 2013 to 2020. At Durban, South Africa, parties agreed to  
negotiate a global agreement that would replace the Kyoto Protocol and be agreed upon by 2015  
and executed in 2020. Other significant outcomes from Durban included “the decision for long- 
term cooperative action under the Convention that sought to operationalize decisions taken in  
Cancun in the areas of climate finance, transparency and reporting, the periodic review,  
adaptation, technology, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD)  
and agreement on the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund and the Technology  
Mechanism.”17 
 However, according to Donald Brown, an author and critic of the Copenhagen Accord,  
the agreement to cooperate on a new binding legal instrument was only a commitment to  
negotiate an agreement, about which almost none of the major issues had been settled, coupled  
with the fact that the new agreement is not likely to become effective until 2020. Brown opposed  
the Durban deal, emphasizing that it failed to put into place national greenhouse gas emissions  
reduction commitments that will prevent catastrophic climate change, did not allocate national  
commitments on the basis of equity, nor provide a just response to the needs of the most  
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https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/statements/application/pdf/101208_cop16_hls_trinidad_tobago.pdf  
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vulnerable to climate change to take necessary adaptation steps.
 18
 
 Although the Durban agreement managed to create a Green Climate Fund  
to serve as a financial mechanism to manage adaptation funding, it failed to identify  
dedicated sources of funding to implement an adaptation agenda that is based upon “mandatory”  
contributions to “new,” “predictable,” and “additional” sources of funding. With that said,  
developed countries failed to fulfill the ethical standards for sufficient funding for adaptation  
programs needed in more vulnerable developing countries.
19
  
 
The 2012 Doha Climate Gateway  
At the 2012 UN Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar, countries adopted The Doha  
Climate Gateway to represent a new commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. Countries at  
Doha agreed on an agenda to adopt a universal climate agreement by 2015 and agreed on a  
“track to raise necessary determination to respond to climate change with an aim to establish  
legal force applicable to all countries starting in 2020.” 20 Furthermore, according to the United  
Nations Environment Program (UNEP)—a United Nations agency formed in 1972 which acts as  
“the voice for the environment within the United Nations system”21— developed countries at  
Doha aimed to support developing countries by agreeing on ways and means to deliver scaled-up  
climate finance and technology to them beyond 2013. They also established a web-based registry  
for governments to record developing country mitigation actions that seek recognition or  
financial support. In addition, they created a new work program for developing countries to build  
capacity through climate change education and training, and established new market mechanisms  
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315. 
19 Ibid. p. 317. 
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outside of the UNFCCC, such as nationally-administered or bilateral offset programs to help  
meet their mitigation targets.
22
 
At Doha, governments further clarified ways to measure deforestation, and to ensure that  
efforts to fight deforestation are supported. They also looked at ways to support the effectiveness  
and environmental integrity of projects under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development  
Mechanism, which includes carbon capture and storage, an option for reducing atmospheric  
emissions of CO2 from human activities.
23
 Moreover, countries embarked on work  
to enable the development and transfer of technologies to help developing countries adapt  
and curb their emissions.
24
  
 In response to the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway, developing countries called for  
compensation, also known as “loss and damage” from high emitting developed countries for  
future climate change impacts in their countries.
25
 Led by the government of Bangladesh,  
developing countries created the “Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative,” in 2012,  
which was a report that laid out evidence of the then current relationships between climatic  
stressors, societal impacts, responses and outstanding loss and damage.
26
 This was significant as  
it highlighted how societies in developing countries are forced to deal with and manage the  
negative impacts of climate change, and further stressed the need for financial compensation  
from developed countries in this respect.
27
  
Although the Doha Climate Gateway focused more on establishing initiatives to fulfill  
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the needs of developing countries, the Doha conference still only established limited progress in  
advancing international talks on climate change and failed to set more ambitious goals for  
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. That failure was seen as contributing to increasing the risk  
of a rise in average global temperatures by two degrees Celsius by the end of this century.  
Moreover, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), in their 2012 Emissions Gap Report,  
stressed that “if the world does not accelerate action on climate change, total greenhouse gas  
emissions could rise to 58 gigatonnes by 2020 (compared to 40 gigatonnes in 2000), far above  
the level scientists say would likely keep temperature rises below 2 degrees Celsius.”28  
Furthermore, studies by the World Bank indicate that even with these commitments and pledges  
fully implemented, there is approximately a 20 percent possibility that temperature increases  
would top 4 degrees Celsius by the end of this century, which could trigger a cascade of  
catastrophic climatic changes including extreme heat-waves, declining global food stocks and   
rising sea levels, which could severely affect hundreds of millions of people, especially those in  
developing countries which are the most vulnerable .
29
  
 
The 2013 Conference in Warsaw 
As described by the UNFCCC, governments convened at the Warsaw Climate Change  
Conference in 2013, where they united in developing key decisions to further advance the  
Durban Platform, the Green Climate Fund and Long-Term Finance and the Warsaw Framework  
for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), which are a set of  
decisions on ways to reduce these emissions. A rulebook for reducing emissions from  
deforestation and forest degradation was agreed on, together with measures to boost forest  
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preservation and the establishment of a results-based payment system to promote forest  
protection. The Green Climate Fund planned to be a major channel of financing for developing  
world action, as it aimed to support projects, policies, activities and programs in developing  
countries.
30
 
Additionally, after much prior deliberation on the issue, governments agreed to form the   
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage to address loss and damage caused by  
long-term climate change impacts in developing countries. Specifically, the mechanism aimed to  
facilitate the exchange of information and best practices for dealing with climate change-induced  
losses and damages, as well as strengthen action and support, including by facilitating the  
mobilization of finance.
31
 In turn, developing countries, under the UNFCCC, finalized a  
comprehensive set of plans to deal with climate change impacts, which aimed to better evaluate  
the immediate impacts of climate change and help enable them to determine the support and  
actions they require to become more resistant and prepared. 
32
 
At the Warsaw Conference, governments acknowledged the limited time to keep  
warming to a maximum of under two degrees Celsius. The urgency for the reduction in global  
greenhouse gas emissions by the second half of this century was apparent. To achieve the  
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, governments agreed that it was critical that action must  
be carried out and coordinated quickly at all levels, which included the international, domestic,  
business and finance. For this reason, the Warsaw Conference provided a showcase for climate  
action by business, cities, regions and civil society.
33
 Yet, although it was apparent that the world  
had the necessary tools to succeed in combating climate change, it was clear at Warsaw that the  
tensions between the developed, the advanced developing and the developing world still stood as  
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a major barrier that prevented the international community to reach a successful solution. 
On the one hand, although the Conference made much progress, developing countries– 
once again–found themselves leaving quite unsatisfied with the outcomes. Countries had agreed  
a year earlier to address “loss and damage” in Warsaw, and the issue took on new importance  
when Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines just days before the Warsaw conference. Small- 
island states and other particularly vulnerable developing countries that had grouped together  
on the climate change negotiations had pressed for years for greater attention to “loss  
and damage” resulting from extreme events and slow-onset impacts such as sea-level rise. As  
parties planned to reach a decision in Warsaw on “institutional arrangements” addressing loss  
and damage, Typhoon Haiyan put the issue front and center.
34
 
 Developed countries, specifically the United States and the European Union, opposed the  
“loss and damage” mechanism. This opposition riled developing countries, and the Conference  
took a turn for the worse. At one point, the Conference neared collapse after developing  
countries walked out.
35
 Even after exhausting hours of deliberation, the “loss and damage”  
mechanism fell well short of what developing countries wanted. Parties established a new forum  
to provide information and expertise, and to consider further steps, but neither advanced  
developing or developed countries made any promise of additional funding.
36
  
As part of the Copenhagen and Cancun agreements, developed countries pledged $30  
billion in climate finance from 2010 through 2012 (known as the “fast start” period) and to  
mobilize $100 billion a year in public and private finance for developing countries by 2020.  
However, at Warsaw, developed countries refused to set a quantified interim goal for ramping up  
climate finance, even though developing countries, concerned by a lack of progress in ramping  
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up finance, made an attempt to push for an interim goal of $70 billion by 2016.
37
 
The Warsaw round ended with decisions on historical responsibility and emission  
reductions pushed off to the future. Like past conferences, parties ruled out binding emission  
targets for any nation. At Warsaw, it was apparent that still, no real progress had been made and  
time was running out. It has been evident that advanced developing and developed nations have  
consistently taken positions based upon national economic interest rather than assisting  
developing countries. However, to prevent a catastrophic temperature increase by the end of the  
century, more action needs to be taken.
38
 
The outcomes of these negotiations have both reflected and exacerbated the tensions  
between groups that have been formed in response to climate change, such as the small-island  
states among the developing countries, advanced developing countries such as China and India,  
and the developed world. The priorities of developing countries have not significantly  
been considered by the advanced developing and developed world. As a result, no clear solution  
has been established to assist developing countries; thus they have been left extremely  
unsatisfied throughout these negotiations. Nonetheless, all groups will have to  
coordinate more together to develop solutions before it is too late.
39
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Paul Rauber. “Extreme Weather: Who’s to Blame?” (March/April 2014) Sierra Magazine - Sierra Club. 
http://vault.sierraclub.org/sierra/201403/grapple-climate-change-extreme-weather.aspx.  
39 Ibid. 
 
35 
 
CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY-KENYA 
 
Climate Change in Kenya 
Figure 4.1: Map of Kenya 
 
   Source-Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 2011. 
Kenya, a country located in East Africa, has a diverse geography and climate. While the  
southeast part of Kenya borders the Indian Ocean with warm tropical beaches, Kenya’s  
Kilimanjaro Mountains hold year-round snow. Other regions include desert, grasslands and  
forests. Kenya's climate is as varied as the land areas; the evenings in the Central Highlands can  
be frigid while coastal areas are usually hot and humid. Typically, there are two rainy seasons;  
the long rains in March-May, and the short rains in September-October.
1
  
There are approximately forty-two million people living in Kenya (July 2013 est.) 
2
  
According to The Environmental Defence Fund (EDF) — an environmental advocacy group  
composed of scientists, economists, attorneys and other professionals who aim to preserve the  
environment — climate change has had a severe impact on Africa, as more intense rainfall and  
                                                 
1 “Kenya Profile,” TWC Corporation-Embassy Avenue, (2007), accessed on February 27, 2014. 
http://www.embassy-avenue.jp/kenya/profile/geo.html.   
2 “Kenya Population Situation Analysis,” (2013). The Government of Kenya and the National Council for 
Population and Development, p. 33, http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/kenya/drive/FINALPSAREPORT.pdf.  
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droughts have occurred due to the speeding up of the cycling of water between the ocean,  
atmosphere and land, which is all associated with global warming.
3
 Extreme weather events and  
the overall increase in temperature throughout the years has harmed rural regions like Kenya, as  
this region has been particularly vulnerable to the effects of global warming.
4
 
The United Nations Development Program’s climate change country profile on Kenya  
shows that Kenya’s mean annual temperature has increased by one degree Celsius since 1960.5  
According to a report made by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), warming in  
Kenya is expected to accelerate with temperatures rising by nearly three degrees Celsius by 
2050.
6
 Along with the temperature rising, sea-levels have also risen and are expected to rise 0.3 
meters in the near future. As a result, Mombasa — Kenya’s second largest city and a prime  
tourism spot located on Kenya’s east coast — is particularly threatened by the great likelihood  
of flooding.
 
This could lead to serious problems such as land being submerged, damaging  
erosion, biodiversity loss, the relocation of homes and a weakened tourism sector, all of which  
would be unfavorable to Kenya’s economy. 7 
Additionally, the climate has had a critical effect on Mount Kenya, Kenya’s highest  
mountain. The reduction in cold temperatures has depleted the mountain’s glaciers, which are a  
vital natural resource of fresh water for the city.
8
 The recent prolonged and severe droughts and  
flooding (See Figure 4.2) have resulted from the changing climate as well. With that said,  
                                                 
3 “Climate Change Impacts” Environmental Defense Fund, accessed February 12, 2014. 
http://www.edf.org/climate/climate-change-impacts. 
4 Mario Herrero et al. “Climate Variability and Climate Change: Impacts on Kenyan Agriculture” International 
Food Policy Research Institute, (2010), pp. 1-3. 
https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10568/2665/Kenya_Project%20Note%201_final.pdf.  
5 C. McSweeney, M. New, and G. Lizcano, “UNDP Climate Change Country Profiles-Kenya”, Oxford Climate 
Data, October 30, (2008), p. 2, http://ncsp.undp.org/document/undp-climate-change-country-profile-kenya.  
6 Gordon O. Ojwang’, Jaspat Agatsiva and Charles Situma, “Case studies of the Laikipia and Narok Districts 
representing major agro-ecological zones in Kenya,” Department of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing (DRSRS) 
and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, (2010), p. 3.  
7 Cynthia Brenda Awuor, Victor Ayo Orindi and Andrew Ochieng Adwera, “Climate change and coastal cities: the 
case of Mombasa, Kenya” Institute for Environment and Development, (2008), pp. 233-237. 
8 Mihai Voda, Victor Sorocovschi, Ramona Ratiu, Radu Negru “Climate Change Effects on Mount Kenya’s 
Glaciers” Academia.edu, p. 75, accessed on February 12, 2014, 
http://www.academia.edu/1075264/Climate_change_effects_on_Mount_Kenyas_Glaciers.  
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Kenya’s trends in temperature, sea levels, rainfall and extreme climatic events all point to clear  
evidence of climate change. 
   Figure 4.2: Kenya’s Erratic Rainfall Trends, 1969-2009. 
 
Source- United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2011. 
(The India-Pacific Index is a measure of temperature and precipitation over the Indian and 
western Pacific Ocean). 
 
Kenya’s Vulnerability to Climate Change 
The Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI), developed by the global risk advisory  
firm Maplecroft, identifies climate-related risks to a country’s population, business and  
government. According to Maplecroft, the CCVI evaluates three factors to come to its findings:  
a country’s exposure to extreme climate-related events, including sea level rise and future  
changes in temperature, precipitation and specific humidity; the sensitivity of populations, in  
terms of health, education, agricultural dependence and available infrastructure; and the adaptive  
capacity of countries to combat the impacts of climate change, which encompasses research and  
development, economic factors, resource security and the effectiveness of government.
9
  
The CCVI has used this evaluation to measure Kenya’s vulnerability to climate change, 
                                                 
9 “Maplecroft | 31% of Global Economic Output Forecast to Face ‘High’ or ‘Extreme’ Climate Change Risks by 
2025 – Maplecroft Risk Atlas.” Maplecroft Global Risks Analytics, (October 30, 2013), 
https://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2013/10/30/31-global-economic-output-forecast-face-high-or-
extreme-climate-change-risks-2025-maplecroft-risk-atlas/.  
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and has ranked Kenya as highly vulnerable to climate change in the years from 2009 to 2013. 
The following two figures (See Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4) are global maps, produced by  
Maplecroft, which illustrate the high vulnerability to climate change which Kenya and its people  
face compared to the rest of the world. 
Figure 4.3: Kenya’s High CCV, 2011. 
 
Source- Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics, 2011. Available at: The Washington Post, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/green/pdfs/ClimateChangeVulnerabilityIndex2011.pdf. 
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Figure 4.4: Human Vulnerability Due to Climate Change 
 
Source- Thow and Blois (2008). Available at: 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/E5549F80673D1E38C12574B0004B698F-
care_mar2008.pdf.  
 
As I describe in detail in the following sections, Kenya has faced reduced  
agricultural production, the worsening of food security, an increased incidence of both flooding  
and drought, and the spread of diseases and scarce land and water resources due to climate  
change. Furthermore, the destruction of African forests has caused an increase in CO2 emissions,  
which has further exacerbated global warming.
 10
 As Kenya is a developing country where its  
people traditionally rely heavily on its climate, geography and natural resources to make a living,  
                                                 
10 Karim Dahou, Doreen Kibuka-Musoke, Brian Ngo and Francesca Pavarini. (2012). “Climate Challenges to 
Africa, A Call for Action.” OECD Journal: General Papers, pp. 4, 8.  
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the changing climate has hampered the country from prospering, which in turn has contributed to  
its inability to acquire the adequate funding needed to properly mitigate and adapt to climate  
change.
11
 
I. Economy, Poverty and Development 
 Throughout recent years, there has been a substantial number of Kenyans living in  
 
poverty, with about fifty percent of them in 2010 living below the poverty line.
12
 According to  
 
the CIA World Fact Book, Kenya’s unemployment rate is high at around forty percent.13 Charles  
 
C. Mutai and Samuel O. Ochola have noted that extreme weather events have serious economic  
 
implications in Kenya, as the increase in frequency and intensity of floods and droughts over the  
 
last decade have caused damage to property and loss of life, reduced business opportunities and  
 
increased the cost of doing business. The poor, who make up the majority of people living in  
 
Kenya, have little protection against extreme climatic events. They have few resource reserves,  
 
poor housing and depend on natural resources for their livelihoods.
14
 Rural poverty in Kenya is  
 
also strongly linked to environmental concerns, especially poor water management, soil erosion,  
 
declining soil fertility and land degradation. Climate change is one of the major challenges  
 
facing the Kenyan economy, as it has dwindled its resource base and has contributed to declining  
 
agricultural yields.
15
 Moreover, according to the World Bank, Kenya is classified as a low  
 
income country, with a GDP at$44.10 billion (2013) .
16
 Additionally, the effects of climate  
 
change have threatened Kenya's tourism industry, a key source of Kenya’s revenue.17 
                                                 
11 Ibid. p. 24. 
12 “Kenya Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper- Vision 2030 First Medium Term Plan” Country Report No. 10/224 
International Monetary Fund, (2010), p. 18, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10224.pdf.  
13 The World Factbook “Economy-Overview” Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), accessed on March 11, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html.  
14 Charles C. Mutal and Samuel O. Ochola, “Chapter 3-Climate Change and Variability.” In the Kenya State of the 
Environment and Outlook 2010 Supporting the Delivery of Vision 2030. National Environment Management 
Authority, Nairobi, Kenya, (2011): 46-60: 46. 
15 “Rural Poverty in Kenya.” Rural Poverty Portal, accessed on March 4, 2014, 
http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/kenya.  
16 The World Bank, “Kenya | Data.” Accessed March 1, 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya.  
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Furthermore, climate change has contributed to Kenya’s chronic budget deficits,  
inflationary pressures and sharp currency depreciations. Additionally, although low global food  
and fuel prices and monetary interventions provided by Kenya’s Central Bank have provided  
some relief for the country following 2012,
 18
 it is apparent that climate change has taken a  
significant toll on Kenya’s economy and in order for the economy to improve, measures to  
mitigate climate change must be implemented.  
II. Desertification 
 Desertification — the process by which an area becomes a desert — happens from the  
 
depletion of plant life and land degradation. Desertification, which has stemmed from global  
warming,  has presented a major economic barrier to Kenya’s development. Erratic weather  
patterns, such as severe droughts and flooding, have resulted in major land degradation and poor  
land use throughout Kenya. The exploitation of Kenya’s forests has further contributed to  
desertification as well. As rural communities make up the majority of Kenya, desertification has  
been widespread and has severely threatened the livelihoods of farmers and their families who  
typically make a living off of growing and selling their crops and livestock.
19
  
III. Food Security  
 The level of food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa, the region where Kenya is located,  
 
has been very high. In this region, more than 150,000 deaths resulted from climate change  
 
scenarios like global warming.
20
  For example, severe droughts which occurred in 2010 and 2011  
 
resulted in four million people requiring food assistance.
21
 Climate change has posed the greatest  
                                                                                                                                                             
17 “National Climate Change Response Strategy” Government of Kenya, (April, 2010): 35. 
18 “The World Factbook-Economy Overview.” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed on March 11, 2014. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html. 
19 “Preparing for Climate Change in Kenya.” International Institute for Sustainable Development, (2008), accessed 
on March 9, 2014, p. 2, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/preparing_for_climate.pdf.  
20 Larry West. "Global Warming - Global Warming Leads to 150,000 Deaths Every Year." Environmental Issues - 
News and Information about the Environment. (November 27, 2011).  
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threat to agriculture and food security, especially in poor agriculture-based countries like Kenya.  
 
Most of the small scale farmers who produce food for subsistence as well as income generation  
 
are unable to meet their basic food needs daily. The most affected members of the population are  
 
women and children, who are more often poorer, and whose daily activities include farming,  
 
fishing, and herding, among others. These groups depend mostly on water, and even where  
 
irrigated agriculture is practiced, Kenya’s natural water resources have been drying up in the  
 
recent past as a result of climate change. 
22
  
 
 Changes in Kenya’s agro-ecological conditions, attributable to climate change, affect  
 
food production. Lands in low latitude areas have lost their agricultural suitability, which has  
 
caused a decrease in food availability and production. Moreover, because global warming is  
 
expected to be a long-standing issue, food insecurity will likely be a frequent occurrence and a  
 
long term issue a well. Food insecurity will also contribute to a reduction of wild ecosystems,  
 
animal death and biodiversity loss.
23
 (See Figure 4.5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 “Rural Poverty in Kenya.” Rural Poverty Portal. 
22 Robert Mburia, “Climate Change and Food Security Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa” Climate Emergency Institute- 
Climate Science Library, (2011), http://www.climateemergencyinstitute.com/food_sec_subsaharan_mburia.html.  
23 Ibid. 
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Figure 4.5: Estimated Food Security Levels in Kenya, Africa, 2011 
 
             
Food security and rural livelihoods are inherently linked to water availability and use.  
As a result of climate change, Kenya has faced challenges in water provision with erratic weather  
patterns in the past few years causing droughts and water shortages. Kenya has a limited  
renewable water supply and is classified as a water scarce country with only 15 percent of its  
available water resources developed.
24
 As of 2012, access to safe water supplies throughout  
Kenya is 59 percent and access to improved sanitation is 32 percent.
25
 Household access to safe  
                                                 
24 “Kenya Country Strategy Paper 2014-2018” African Development Bank Group, (2014), p. 7, 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/2014-2018_-
_Kenya_Country_Strategy_Paper.pdf.  
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water, notably in rural areas, has remained low. Despite improvements after 2012, only 70.5  
percent of urban households and 49.2 percent of rural households have had access to safe water,  
thus, there is still an unmet need in rural and urban areas for both clean water and sanitation.
26
  
IV. Health 
 
Due to the water shortage and food insecurity brought on by climate change in Kenya, the  
 
health of millions of Kenyans have been compromised. In particular, women and young children  
  
are at great risk, as water contamination has greatly threatened proper and safe maternal care.   
 
For instance, hospitals in Kenya like the Kakamega Provincial District General Hospital have to  
 
collect buckets of water which are then provided to its patients. The water is polluted with  
 
bacteria, viruses and parasites and many patients develop different diseases such as typhoid,  
 
malaria and cholera as a result. Waterborne diseases are the leading cause of death in African  
 
children under the age of five, and since the hospitals in Kenya lack a sufficient supply of clean  
 
water, women who give birth are likely to develop waterborne diseases and hundreds of new- 
 
borns and infants die as a result. 
27
 
 
People in Kenya often go hungry, as erratic weather patterns prevent farmers from  
 
properly growing crops and they are unable to sell livestock. Children suffer and die from  
 
malnutrition and disease, and of those who survive, half are stunted physically or mentally.  
 
Climate change has exacerbated the inadequate and unprotected water and food supplies, which  
 
has led to problems such as poor sanitation and hygiene, overcrowding, and limited availability  
 
of  resources. As a result, diseases like Cholera, remain a major public health problem that  
 
causes substantial morbidity and mortality in Kenya.
28
 Moreover, the lack of food and fresh  
                                                                                                                                                             
25 “Kenya-The Water and Sanitation Crisis” water.org, accessed on March 12, 2014, 
http://water.org/country/kenya/.  
26 “Kenya Country Strategy Paper” Africa Development Bank Group, p.7.  
27 Njeru, Gitonga, “Kenya: Climate Change Water Crisis Impacts Hospital Maternal Care” Women’s News Network 
(2010), accessed on March 15, 2014, http://womennewsnetwork.net/2010/07/13/kenya-climate-change-water-crisis-
impacts-hospital-maternal-care/.  
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water sources often gives rise to a vicious cycle in which infectious diseases lead or contribute to  
 
aggravated hunger, making communities more susceptible to these diseases, which may further  
 
lead to reductions in labor productivity, thereby increasing poverty, morbidity and mortality.  
 
As my hypothesis states that only when developing countries actually begin to feel the  
impacts of climate change are they likely to participate actively in international and regional  
negotiations, it is indeed evident that Kenya, a developing country, has been highly vulnerable to  
the effects brought on by the changing environment. The following section will review Kenya’s  
approach to climate change and its participation in the recent international climate change  
negotiations. Then, through quantitative analysis, I will determine involvement by examining a  
set of factors, which include (1) how many negotiations they attended and attendance at other  
relevant sessions; (2) the number of people in the Kenya’s delegation and proportion of high- 
level delegates; (3) the number of times, if any, Kenya spoke at these sessions; (4) the number of  
times, if any, Kenya presented a proposal; and (5) if Kenya led, advocated, or sponsored on  
behalf of other developing countries. Ultimately, I will investigate whether or not climate change  
vulnerability was a direct motivator for high participation in the climate change negotiations, or  
if there were any other conditions that affected participation. 
 
 
Kenya’s Approach to Climate Change 
 
Since 1965, Kenya has been involved in efforts aimed at addressing the environment and  
 
problems associated with it. As illustrated in its Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, the Kenyan  
 
government had acknowledged concern over economic growth and development and that  
 
environmental preservation was crucial in determining use of its land and natural resources.
29
 In  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
28 “Kenya Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper- Vision 2030 First Medium Term Plan (2008-2012) International 
Monetary Fund (2010), pp.106-107, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10224.pdf.  
29 Peter Nyarang’o “The Long Road to Universal Coverage” Strathmore University, (2010), p. 7, 
http://www.strathmore.edu/pdf/ProfPeterNyarango.pdf.   
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the years leading up to 2009, Kenya had made attempts to achieve sustainable development, as  
 
illustrated by Kenya’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP);The Economic Recovery  
 
Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS); and Kenya’s Development Blueprint  
 
Vision 2030. Furthermore, the new Constitution of Kenya and relevant amendments that have  
 
been incorporated over the years have reinforced the policy and legal basis of sustainable  
 
development in Kenya.
30
 One of the most significant displays of Kenya’s commitment includes  
 
its joining and ratification of three international treaties, the United Nations Framework  
 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), whose aim is to cooperatively consider actions to  
 
limit average global temperature increases and the resulting climate change, and to cope with  
 
whatever impacts which were, by then, inevitable; the United Nations Convention on Biological  
 
Diversity (UNCBD) and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).
31
 
 
  Kenya has displayed a consistent record on environmental issues. In 1994, it asked for  
 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) — a UN organization created in 1972  
 
which serves as a voice for the environment within the UN system — to be located in Nairobi.  
 
The Kenyan delegation at the time, led by former ambassador Joseph Odero-Jowi and the then  
 
Foreign Minister Njoroge Mungai, embarked on a major pursuit to secure UNEP for Nairobi.  
 
However, Kenya was met with a negative international response, as the UN, which had never  
 
headquartered its agencies in the developing world, was reluctant to locate UNEP in Nairobi.  
 
Angry with the UN’s members’ cold response, the Kenyan delegation criticized the UN for not  
 
acting as a true global organization, and continued to press for UNEP’s establishment in  
Nairobi.
32
  
 
                                                 
30 “Sustainable Development in Kenya: Stocktaking in the run up to Rio+20,” Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations, 
(2012), p. 2, accessed on March 4, 2014, http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/985kenya.pdf.  
31 Ibid. p. 1.  
32 “UNEP-The First 40 Years A Narrative by Stanley Johnson,” United Nations Environment Programme (2012), 
pp. 31-33, http://www.unep.org/pdf/40thbook.pdf.  
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As Kenya publicly expressed their discontent with the UN system, Odero-Jowi, Kenya’s  
 
then ambassador to the UN in New York, named the situation "unjust" and immediately called  
 
for New York, Geneva, London and Vienna to withdraw from bidding to host UNEP.  
 
Meanwhile, Mungai successfully pushed other African states to have a common stand on hosting  
 
the new body in Africa. After Mungai came to an agreement with other African states, he  
 
delivered a speech in which he emphasized that no UN headquarters had yet been established in  
 
Asia, South America, Africa, or Eastern Europe.”33 
 
Mungai’s speech, along with the lobbying of a powerful delegation provided by Kenya,  
 
convinced several African, Caribbean, and other non-African countries thereafter to side with  
 
Nairobi as the pick for UNEP’s headquarters. This was a major achievement for Kenya, Africa  
 
and the developing world as a whole, as the United Nations General Assembly had mandated  
 
UNEP to provide leadership in addressing issues surrounding climate change in the African  
 
region.
34
 The successful establishment of UNEP in Nairobi, along with Kenya’s strong efforts  
 
and interest in environmental matters, are a clear indication that Kenya was extremely driven to  
 
be involved long before the 2009-2013 negotiations took place. However, as Kenya has become  
 
more vulnerable to climate change in recent years, (recall that Maplecroft ranks the country very  
 
high on climate change vulnerability), it has become even more interested in international  
 
climate change negotiations to combat environmental deterioration and to secure a safer and  
 
more sustainable future. Furthermore, Kenya has established itself as a central country in Africa,  
 
speaking on behalf of all countries within the continent about environmental matters.  
 
 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 UNEP “Climate Change in Kenya’ United Nations Environment Programme, accessed on March 12, 2014, 
http://www.unep.org/roa/Programmes/KenyaCountryProgramme/KCP_Climate_Change/tabid/52011/Default.aspx.  
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Kenya’s Role in the Negotiations: Delegate Representation 
 
Kenya had a total number of 372 delegates and 72 high-level delegates at the five  
climate change negotiations from 2009-2013, (not including other relevant sessions). By looking  
at the Average Number of Delegates (AND) from Tanzania, Sudan and Myanmar at these  
negotiations, which are similar countries in terms of population and wealth, I have compared  
Kenya’s Delegation Count (DC) to the AND to see how Kenya ranks in terms of its  
representation at the negotiations (See Table 4.1). Tanzania sent 250 delegates, Sudan sent 126  
delegates, and Myanmar sent 15 delegates. As the Table illustrates, the AND of Tanzania, Sudan  
and Myanmar is 130. According to the benchmark, since Kenya’s DC is 372 delegates, which is  
well above the AND+25, Kenya ranks above the average representation and has earned 10 
points as a result. 
 
Table 4.1: Points for Delegate Representation in 2009-2013 Climate Change Negotiations 
 
Benchmark: 
DC is 25+ AND=country has above average representation (10 Points) 
DC is 10-25 more than AND=(8 points) 
DC is AND +/- 10= country has average representation (5 Points) 
DC is less than AND-10= country has below average representation (2 Points)  
 
 
Average Number of 
Delegates (AND): 
130 
Kenya’s Total 
Delegate Count (DC): 
372 
Benchmark: 
DC greater than 
AND+25 
Points Earned: 10 
 
       
 
 
In order to determine overall involvement, I have added the ten points earned for  
Kenya’s delegate representation in Table 4.2 on the following page.  
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Kenya’s Role in the Negotiations: Determining Involvement 
 
Table 4.2: Determining Involvement 
Number of times 
for Attendance at 
Negotiations:5  
 
Attendance at 
Other African 
Sessions:1 
Number of 
Points for 
Delegate 
Representation 
at Negotiations: 
10 points 
 
Number of 
High-Level 
Delegates: 
72 (19.4%)- 
*8 points 
Number 
of times 
Kenya 
Spoke: 8 
Number of 
times 
Kenya 
Presented a 
Proposal: 8 
Did Kenya 
Lead, 
Advocate or 
Sponsor for 
Other 
Developing 
Countries?  
Yes=3 
Number 
of Points:  
43 
* Kenya’s high-level delegation percentage is just below the range for countries scoring ten points. Its score 
has been modified to reflect this. To see the scale of percentage ranges and points, refer to chapter 2. 
41-50 points A+ grade 
31-40points A grade 
21-30 points B grade 
11-20 points C grade 
 0-10 points D grade 
 
Table 4.2 represents an assessment of Kenya’s involvement in the recent climate change  
negotiations. According to the table above, Kenya received a total of 43 points, which gives it an  
A plus level grade exemplifying exceptional participation. Kenya attended all five negotiations  
and attended one other special session in Africa, the 2009 Pan-African Summit, to get a  
combined score of six. As previously noted, Kenya received 10 points for its delegate  
representation as a result of its 372-member delegation, which ranks well above the average  
representation when compared to similar countries. Kenya also received eight points for sending  
72 high-level delegates. Furthermore, during the various negotiations, Kenya spoke eight times,  
presented a proposal eight times, and advocated on behalf of other countries. Thus, in reference  
to the analysis, Kenya has been very highly proactive and greatly committed throughout all of  
the negotiations. 
Through Kenya’s high attendance at all five negotiations and one other African session,  
along with its 372-member delegation and a total of 72 high-level delegates, Kenya established a  
50 
 
powerful platform to deliver its requests and negotiate with other countries in a strong and  
influential manner. Kenya’s high-level delegation included: Kenya’s then President  
Mwai Kubaki, who attended the 2009 Pan-African Summit and the 2009 Copenhagen Summit;  
Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who attended the 2009 Copenhagen Summit and the 2010 Cancun  
Conference; and Kenya's Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Environment and Mineral  
Resources, Ali Mohammed, who attended the 2011 Durban Conference and the 2012 Doha  
Climate Gateway. In addition, attending the Copenhagen Summit were: John Michuki,  
Kenya’s Minister for Environment and Natural Resources; Dr. Noah Wekesa, Minister of  
Forestry and Wildlife; Moses Wetangula, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Kiraitu Murungi,  
Minister of Energy.
35
  
 
I. Proposals 
 
Throughout the negotiations, Kenya put forward several significant proposals about  
achieving worldwide sustainable development. Kenya's Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of  
Environment and Mineral Resources, Ali Mohammad and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, along  
with the rest of Kenya’ delegation, presented eight statements/proposals that stood out: 
(1) At the 2011 Cancun negotiations, Kenya requested $100 billion a year until 2020 and 
$30 billion in fast-track financing to be made available from 2010 to 2012. Kenya asked 
for half of the fast-track financing to go to grants and adaptation.
36
  
(2) At the 2012 Durban negotiations, Kenya proposed for developed country parties to adopt 
a 2nd commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol covering the period 2013-2017 with 
ambitious quantifiable targets without any conditionality’s. 37  
                                                 
35 Dave Opiyo, “Kibaki leads Strong Kenya Team to Climate Talks,” Daily Nation News (2009), accessed on 
October 3, 2014, http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/820114/-/3d4uo4z/-/index.html.  
36 “Statement of Rt. Hon. Raila A. Odinga at COP 16” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
accessed on October 3, 2014, 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/statements/application/pdf/101207_cop16_hls_kenya.pdf.  
37 “Statement by the Hon. John N. Michuki, Minister of Environment and Mineral Resources, Kenya, at the High 
Level Segment of COP 17, Durban, South Africa. (December 7, 2011.) United Nations Framework Convetnion on 
Climate Change, p.3.  
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(3) Also at Durban, Kenya urged for similar and comparable targets of a 2nd commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol to be taken by developed countries that are not parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol.
38
 
(4) At the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway, Kenya acknowledged the uncertainty of financial 
support between the end of the fast start finance period of 2012. Thus, Kenya demanded 
that a financing target and a process toward the realization of $100 billion must be 
agreed in Doha.
39
 
(5) Also at Doha, Kenya submitted a proposal for advancing the goal of gender balance, in 
which it supported improvement in the participation of women in the UNFCCC 
negotiations and in the representation of parties established pursuant to the Convention 
of the Kyoto Protocol.
40
 
(6) In the months leading up to the Warsaw talks, Kenya created a Readiness Preparation 
Proposal (R-PP), which outlined the process by which the Government of Kenya would 
develop its national strategy for participating in an evolving international mechanism for 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conserving and enhancing 
stocks and sustainably managing forests (REDD+).
41
 (REDD alone refers to reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries).
42
 At 
Warsaw, Kenya used this framework to press for the facilitation of the implementation 
of REDD+ activities in developing countries.
43
 
(7) At the Warsaw talks, Kenya requested for direct access to the Green Climate Fund, 
reiterated key principles on climate financing and called for the continuation of funding 
to support ambitious climate action in developing countries.
44
 
(8) Also at the Warsaw talks, Kenya called for the establishment of an international 
mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change in developing 
countries.
45
 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 “Statement by Mr. Ali Daud Mohamed, COP 18.” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
(December 6, 2012)  p. 3, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop18_cmp8_hl_statements/Statement%20by%20Kenya%20%28Cop%2018%29.pdf  
40 Kenya’s Submission to the UNFCCC on Gender Balance Decision 23/CP. 18, accessed on September 3, 2014, p. 
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II. An Advocate for Other Countries 
  
In the several speeches, proposals and presentations that Kenya gave at the negotiations,  
 
Kenya advocated not only for itself but also for other poorer developing countries that were  
 
vulnerable and did not have the financial means to properly combat climate change. Kenya’s  
 
strong advocacy at the negotiations is summarized below in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Kenya’s Support for Other Developing Nations 
 
2009 Pan-African 
Summit 
Kenya’s President Kibaki, on behalf of the African Union, urged 
developing countries to come together to agree on creating an 
international framework to deliver at Copenhagen that would be in 
the best interest of Africa and other poor nations, as some of them 
had been hit the worst by climate change.
46
  
2009 Copenhagen 
Summit 
President Kibaki delivered a powerful speech when he addressed 
the high-level segment of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC). He 
reaffirmed Kenya’s commitment to environmental conservation 
and emphasize the need to address the issue of climate change 
along with the consequences Africa faced such as poverty, access 
to energy, and food security.
47
 
2010 Cancun 
Conference 
Kenya’s Prime Minister Raila Odinga announced a new partnership 
with France, known as the Global Partnership on Clean Energy, 
which would assist all countries in Africa and the most climate 
vulnerable countries. The partnership aims to create a common 
framework to mobilize financing for generation, distribution and 
connectivity of renewable energy, enough to raise electricity by 
100% by 2030.
48
 
2011 Durban 
Conference 
Kenya's Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Environment and 
Mineral Resources Ali Mohammed, on behalf of the African 
Group, urged the international community to accelerate the process 
towards a new climate treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol, which 
would be based on compelling scientific evidence on rising 
temperatures and their impact on vulnerable nations.
49
 
                                                 
46 “African Leaders Meet to Create Unified Climate Stance” VOA News, accessed on October 8, 2014, 
http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2009-10-13-voa44/414629.html.  
47 “Kenya’s President Kibaki Leaves For Copenhagen Summit” The South-South Information Gateway, Ministry of 
Communications and Multimedia Malaysia. (2009).  
48 Statement by Kenya at the High Level Segment of COP16/CMP6 - 101207_cop16_hls_kenya.pdf.” United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, p. 5, accessed on October 6, 2014, 
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49 “Kenya Presses for a New Climate Treaty in Durban” Xinhua Net News (2011) accessed October 9, 2014, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2011-12/03/c_131286494.htm.  
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2012 Doha Climate 
Gateway 
Before the Doha conference, Ali Mohammed spoke on behalf of 
developing countries to elaborate their common position that 
included the desire for a new climate treaty, financing and new 
technologies to help them make the transition to cleaner, “green” 
economic practices. He called for all nations to address climate 
change in order to achieve sustainable development and states that 
Africa, small island developing states and least developed 
countries continue to suffer most from the effects of climate 
change.”50 
2013 Warsaw Talks Kenya’s delegation, on behalf of the African Group, engaged the 
global community on negotiations relating to climate change 
adaptation measures and reiterated its concern over the lack of 
funding from richer countries needed for adaptation in poorer, 
developing countries.
51
  
   
 As illustrated in the Table 4.3, Kenya advocated for at least three groups (Africa, least  
 
developed countries and small island developing states, giving it three extra points. Its high-level  
 
delegation joined with regional groups in Africa such as the African Group and the African  
 
Union to promote greater environmental protection in Africa. Kenya also collaborated with the  
 
Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) and the  
 
African Ministers (a group of Ministers from 53 countries in Africa, including Kenya) at the  
 
conferences to negotiate key matters that would be most beneficial to Africa in respect to climate  
 
change.
52
 
 
 In addition, the African Group, with Kenya fully participating, took the opportunity at the  
 
Warsaw Conference to meet with important leaders to discuss ideas about how the continent  
 
could shift towards a more low-carbon future. Specifically, they met with UN Secretary General  
 
Ban Ki-Moon to discuss plans concerning how Africa could implement sustainable development  
 
                                                 
50 Richard Munang and Zhen Han, “What does the Doha Climate Gateway Mean for Africa?” Africa Renewal 
Online, (May 2013), p.22, http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-2013/what-does-%E2%80%98doha-
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51 “Summary of the Warsaw Climate Change Conference,” International Institute for Sustainable Development. 
2013, accessed on October 11, 2014.  http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12594e.html.  
52 “Africa Presents Common Position at Climate Change Negotiations.” (2014), The New Partnership for Africa’s 
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within its major cities. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon emphasized the important role cities  
 
play in the urgent response to global climate change, and Kenya played a significant role in the  
 
discussion as its capital, Nairobi, is a city that has engaged in plans to transform its urban  
 
planning, home building and transportation to meet sustainable objectives for the future.
53
  
 
 
 
Reasons for Kenya’s Good Performance 
 
 
Vulnerability and Performance 
 
It is proposed here that there is a positive link between Kenya’s vulnerability to climate  
 
change and its performance in the climate change negotiations. In Maplecroft’s CCVI, (See  
 
Figure 4.3), Kenya’s level of vulnerability to climate change was classified as “very high”  
 
between 2009 and 2013, as climate change had taken a toll on Kenya’s economic, agricultural,  
 
health, and food and water sectors. Moreover, Kenya’s officials, such as parliament member  
 
David Koech, who served as chairman of the Pan-African Parliamentarians' Network on Climate  
 
Change, cited the country’s vulnerability to the changing environment as a firm reason to be  
 
committed to environmental affairs. At the Pan-African Summit, which was a meeting held by  
 
African delegates in the months leading up to the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, Koech specifically  
 
stated that Africans were calling for global action on climate change mitigation because they  
 
continued to experience the harsh reality of an unfriendly climate. Speaking to the other  
 
delegates, Koech stated, 
 
Look at the animals that we lost the other day because of drought. Look at our lakes, they 
are drying up. Look at our rivers, they are drying up. All of us are really feeling the 
effect, and therefore the need to sign. But we must ensure that the developed world also 
comes to support us in this endeavor.
54
  
                                                 
53 United Nations News Centre “At Climate Change Talks, Ban Stresses Major Role of Cities in Mitigating Impact.” 
United Nations News Centre (2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46553#.VIR7YMknKZR.  
54 “African Leaders Meet to Create Unified Climate Stance” VOA News. 
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In view of this vulnerability, President Kibaki urged African delegates at the Pan-African  
 
Summit to use their capacity as political leaders to accept the challenge to combat climate  
 
change. He stated,  
 
I am aware that the path to a greener world is not easy but we must soldier on. We must 
take aggressive initiatives to provide for the reduction of greenhouse gases and 
domestication of international and regional conventions and protocol on climate 
change.
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Kenya’s high vulnerability to climate change prompted the country to become even more active  
 
in environmental issues than it already had been since the 1970s when it became the  
 
headquarters of UNEP.  
 
 
Other Factors: 
 
Aid and Performance 
 
As previously discussed, Kenya is a low income country. We also noted  
 
that climate change has affected its ability to grow the economy, thus it is to be expected that  
 
Kenya would need aid to assist it with countering climate change. Kenya has consistently asked  
 
for aid for itself and others. Table 4.4 gives examples of aid that Kenya has received to combat  
 
climate change. These projects have helped to improve various sectors in Kenya that have been  
 
negatively affected by climate change and as a result have assisted in the country’s overall  
 
development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55  “UNEP Hosts African Parliaments Summit on Climate Change.” (2009). United Nations Environment 
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56 
 
 
Table 4.4: Aid to Kenya to Counter Climate Change, 2008-2013. 
 
Donor/Fund Sector Program/Project Themes/Description Funding 
Special Climate 
Change Fund 
(SCCF), World Bank, 
& UNDP 
Agriculture Kenya: Adaptation to 
Climate Change in Arid 
Lands (KACCAL)
56
  
Adaptation $6.5 million 
Multi-Donor, World 
Bank as 
Administrator 
Agriculture Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF)
57
 
REDD $3.4 million 
International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) 
Energy Climate Change Investment 
Program for Africa (SIDA)
58
 
Advisory Services and 
Investment in Renewable 
Energy 
$100 million 
over 5 years 
Nordic Development 
Fund (NDF) 
Multiple Climate Change Facility Innovative climate change 
projects 
€2 million  
Spain (Main) & 
Denmark, Norway. 
Energy Connection of a new wind 
power project in Kenya’s 
Lake Turkana region to the 
national grid. 
 
Provides clean and 
affordable energy and 
enhanced energy 
diversification all while 
saving 16,000,000 tons of 
C02 emissions. 
€115 million 
Spain (Main) & 
Denmark, Norway.
 
 
Infrastructure Connection of Kenya’s 
landlocked Great Rift Valley 
Region to the rest of the 
country.  
Provides improved 
infrastructure linked to the 
wind farm, including a 
road, fiber-optic cable and 
electrification. 
€115 million 
France-The Agence 
Francaise de 
Developement 
(AFD). 
Water & 
Sanitation 
Improvement of Kenya’s 
water supply and sanitation 
services as part of the 
Millennium Cities 
Initiative—a project of 
Columbia University’s Earth 
Institute. 
Public-private 
partnerships were 
developed to increase 
water and sanitation  
coverage in Kenya’s 
informal settlements of 
Nyalenda and Manyatta. 
$20 million 
 
Sources: Norrington-Davis and Thornton (2011); The African Development Bank Group (2013); 
and Blaustein (2010).  
 
In addition, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
 
(OECD), Kenya has received a large amount of development assistance (ODA) from developed  
 
countries for environmental projects in recent years (See Table 4.5).  
 
                                                 
56 The Adaptation to Climate Change in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Project (KACCAL) works to improve the ability 
of participating districts and communities in the arid and semi-arid lands to plan and implement climate change 
adaptation measures.  
57 The Forest Partnership Carbon Facility (FCPF) is a global partnership of governments, businesses, civil society, 
and Indigenous Peoples focused on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, forest carbon 
stock conservation, the sustainable management of forests, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries (activities commonly referred to as REDD+). 
58 The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), is a government agency working on behalf 
of the Swedish parliament and government, with the mission to reduce poverty in the world. 
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Table 4.5: ODA to Kenya for the Environment 
 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2014). 
Available at: www.stats.oecd.org  
 
 
As illustrated in Table 4.4, Kenya was able to secure a substantial amount of funding  
 
from the international community for various domestic protocols (in the forms of policy,  
 
administrative management, research, education, and training) in order to be better equipped to  
 
handle environmental issues. Thus, seeing how funding for environmental issues was a major  
 
necessity, it is likely that the securement of environmental assistance was a factor besides  
 
vulnerability that could explain Kenya’s high level of participation in the climate change  
 
negotiations.  
 
Prestige and Performance 
 
 The funding illustrated in the tables above greatly benefits Kenya’s drive to increase its  
 
economic influence in the region. Given its continuous efforts to secure funding for the region  
 
and for developing countries, it is likely that Kenya has been seeking to achieve a strong political  
 
influence throughout Africa and gain prestige within the international community on the issue of  
 
the environment. This was first demonstrated through its bid to secure the headquarters of the  
 
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) in Nairobi. Since then, Kenya has cemented its  
 
leadership through its active involvement throughout the negotiations on climate change. 
 
 
Allocation 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Environmental 
Policy & 
Administrative 
Management 
$5.5 M. $4 M. $4.6 M. $4.2 M. $600,000 $18.9 M. 
Environmental 
Education & 
Training 
   $100,000  $100,000 
Environmental 
Research 
  $300,000  $100,000 $400,000 
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Assessment 
 
Overall, two things stand out. First, Kenya scores very well on participation in the  
 
climate change negotiations. Second, Kenya has pushed for financial aid both for developing  
 
countries as a whole and for its own domestic projects. Since Kenya has not had the adequate  
 
financial means to combat the harsh effects of climate change, it does not want to miss out on the  
 
potential funding for development and climate change mitigation and adaption that could come  
 
out of the negotiations. In addition, Kenya’s desire for prestige and political influence within the  
 
East African region and the international community are two factors, aside from its own  
 
vulnerability to climate change, that have motivated Kenya to be active in environmental  
 
negotiations. As discussed, Kenya wants to be seen as a leader in environmental matters.
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY-QATAR 
 
 
Climate Change in Qatar 
  
Qatar, a small peninsula located in the Middle East, has a population of 2.1 million
1
  
 
and borders the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia. It is made up mostly of flat, barren desert,  
 
and has arid and mild winters and very hot, humid summers.
2
 Climate change in recent years  
 
has threatened Qatar’s environment, agriculture and health in many ways. For example,  
 
desertification, a process of land degradation exacerbated by climate change, consumes the  
 
country and droughts have resulted in limited access to very few natural fresh water resources.  
 
However, though Qatar has faced environmental concerns, it has rapidly achieved prosperity and  
 
economic, human, and social development. Qatar has advanced from position 57 to  
 
34 out of 179 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index in less than a  
 
decade.
3
 
Figure 5.1: Map of Qatar 
 
 
 
Source- West and Mustafa Al-Mulla (2013).  
                                                 
1 “Data-Qatar” The World Bank, accessed on October 15, 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/country/qatar.  
2 “Qatar - Places in the News | Library of Congress.” Library of Congress, (2013), accessed on November 12, 2014, 
http://www.loc.gov/today/placesinthenews/archive/2013arch/20130625_qatar.html. 
3 “Qatar a Country at a Crossroads,” 2012 United Nations Climate Change Conference, p. 3, accessed on November 
5, 2014, http://www.cop18.qa/Portals/0/QATAR_RAND_V5_261112.pdf.  
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While climate change has affected various sectors of the country, such as  
 
Qatar’s environment and natural resource base, its booming economy has helped to prevent  
 
significant environmental vulnerability. Due to the exploitation of large oil and gas  
 
fields since the 1940s, Qatar has profited and relied heavily on oil and gas reserves, which has  
 
substantially contributed to its expanding economy. As a result of Qatar’s economic boom, it has  
 
been able to expand and rely heavily on alternative technologies to combat environmental  
 
concerns. For example, Qatar has relied heavily on desalination, which is the process of filtering  
 
water from the sea, streams and other water bases and converting it to fresh water.  
 
According to Scientific American, although desalination is a practical technology used to  
 
access clean, available water, it does pose long-term negative environmental risks. For instance,  
 
desalination burns many more fossil fuels compared with the equivalent amount of fresh water  
 
that is obtained from fresh water bodies. As such, the very proliferation of desalinization plants  
 
around the world — approximately 13,000 which already supply fresh water in 120 nations,  
 
primarily in the Middle East —is both a reaction to and one of the many contributors to global  
 
warming.
4
 In addition, not only has climate change threatened Qatar’s marine environment,  
 
which is at risk of warming and acidification,
5
 but the proliferation of desalinization in Qatar  
 
and elsewhere could take a further destructive toll on ocean biodiversity and could damage  
 
marine ecosystems. Through the process of desalination, pipes essentially vacuum up and  
 
inadvertently kill millions of microbial organisms that constitute the base layer of the marine  
 
food chain. Furthermore for every gallon of freshwater produced, another gallon of twice as  
 
concentrated salt water must be disposed of, which creates a lasting salty muck that can  
 
considerably harm marine ecosystems.
6
  
                                                 
4 “The Impacts of Relying on Desalination for Water,” Scientific American Magazine (January 20, 2009), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-impacts-of-relying-on-desalination/. 
5 “Qatar a Country at a Crossroads,” 2012 United Nations Climate Change Conference, p. 5.  
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Human activity in Qatar has threatened the environment and there is the likelihood of  
 
greater climate change in years to come. Qatar is one of the highest energy consumers of the  
 
world and its carbon emissions per capita are the highest in the world, three times as high as the  
 
United States.
7
 Qatar’s energy usage is very high, as fuel combusted during the production of  
 
energy and energy-related products accounts for 67 percent of Qatar’s total CO2 emissions.8  
 
Citizens are provided with free electricity and free water, but, as already mentioned, these are  
 
produced by the energy-intensive activity of desalinating seawater. Moreover, energy demand is  
 
rising by 7 percent a year to run the desalinators and air conditioners that maintain life in the  
 
desert and the natural gas production equipment that funds it.
9
 
 
 As of 2011, Qatar’s rate of CO2 emissions from the consumption of energy was  
 
estimated to be at 64.46 million.
10
 CO2 emissions stem from the burning of fossil fuels and the  
 
manufacture of cement. They include carbon dioxide produced during consumption of solid,  
 
liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring (See Figure 5.2). Furthermore, the Brookings Doha 
 
Center, which has undertaken research on the socio-economic and geopolitical issues facing  
 
the broader Middle East,
11
 created a briefing paper on the Doha Carbon and Energy Forum  
 
2013. The Doha and Energy Forum 2013 was a conference in Qatar that served as a premier  
 
platform for country officials and international experts to discuss carbon dioxide emissions,  
 
carbon abatement solutions, alternative energy, energy efficiency, and new technology in the  
                                                                                                                                                             
6 “The Impacts of Relying on Desalination for Water,” Scientific American Magazine.  
7 Rachel Kaufman, “Pictures: Ten Countries With the Biggest Environmental Footprints” National Geographic, 
accessed on October 8, 2014, http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/sustainable-earth/pictures-
ten-countries-with-the-biggest-footprints/.  
8 “Qatar a Country at a Crossroads,” 2012 United Nations Climate Change Conference, p. 12. 
9 Rachel Kaufman, “Pictures: Ten Countries With the Biggest Environmental Footprints.”  
10 “The World Factbook, Middle East: Qatar” Central Intelligence Agency, p. 10, accessed on October 9, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_qa.pdf.  
11 “Brookings Doha Center | Brookings Institution,” accessed on October 9, 2014, 
http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/doha.  
 
62 
 
 
country.
12
 According to the briefing paper, Qatar has and must continue to take steps to reduce  
 
carbon emissions and find alternative green technologies, such as implementing solar and  
 
renewable energy sources to preserve the environment.
13
 
 
Figure 5.2: CO2 Emissions from Qatar 
 
 
 
Source-U.S. Department of Energy (2012). (Taken from Carbon Dioxide 
Information Analysis Center: http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/qat.html.) 
 
 
Qatar’s Vulnerability to Climate Change  
 
While Qatar is not characterized by Maplecroft’s Climate Change Vulnerability Index  
 
(CCVI) as highly vulnerable to climate change —it is considered to be at “low risk” between  
 
the years of 2009-2013 (See Chapter 4-Figure 4.3) — Qatar has faced pressing questions  
 
from the international community related to the challenge of developing a sustainable future.  
 
Qatar relies heavily on its large oil and gas reserves to fuel its economy. However, Qatar’s rapid  
 
development has put the country at a crossroads; its rich fossil fuel resources have created both  
 
economic opportunities as well as difficult environmental challenges.  
 
                                                 
12 “Doha Carbon & Energy Forum- About the Forum” Doha Carbon and Energy Forum, accessed on October 9, 
2014, http://www.dcef-qatar.org/.  
13 “Doha Carbon and Energy Forum-2013 Briefing Paper Solar Energy and Other Alternative Energy” Global 
Economy and Development at Brookings, (2013), pp. 1-2, accessed on October 14, 2014, http://www.dcef-
qatar.org/app/media/7943.  
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I. Economy 
 
 Qatar is one of the richest countries in the Middle East and in the world. Possessing more  
 
than 15 percent of the world's proven gas reserves, Qatar has ambitions to become a global  
 
energy giant.
14
 With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of more than $180,000,  
 
according to the World Bank (See Figure 5.3), Qatar has prospered in the last several years with  
 
continued high real GDP growth. Despite the global financial crisis in 2009, Qatar has continued  
 
to maintain steady economic growth. GDP is driven largely by changes in oil prices and by  
 
investment in the energy sector.
15
 Qatar has a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of   
 
$85,550 (2013).
16
 Qatar’s economic policy is focused on developing its non-associated natural  
 
gas reserves and increasing private and foreign investment in non-energy sectors. However, oil  
 
and gas still account for more than 50 percent of GDP, roughly 85 percent of export earnings,  
 
and 50 percent of government revenues.
17
  
 
Oil and gas have made Qatar the world's highest per-capita income country and the  
 
country with the lowest unemployment, which is less than 1 percent. Proved oil reserves in  
 
excess of 25 billion barrels should enable continued output at current levels for about 57 years.  
 
Qatar's proved reserves of natural gas exceed 25 trillion cubic meters, about 13 percent of the  
 
world total and third largest in the world.
18
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 “BBC News - Qatar Country Profile - Overview.” British Broadcasting Corporation News, (November 25, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14702226.  
15 The World Factbook, “Economy Overview-Qatar” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed on October 9, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html.  
16 “Qatar | Data.” The World Bank, accessed on October 15, 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/country/qatar.  
17 “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency. 
18 Ibid. 
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Figure 5.3: Qatar’s GDP Growth 2004-2014. 
 
 
Source-The World Bank/Trading Economics (2014). 
 
 
II. Desertification  
 
Climate change has contributed to the growing rate of desertification in Qatar, which has  
 
been widespread. Desertification in the Arab region remains a serious problem, as major hazards  
 
are sand encroachment, salinity and erosion of cropland, and the frequent occurrence of sand  
 
storms. Re-occurring droughts, which stem from climate change, have been the most serious  
 
natural disaster that has affected the Arab region. In addition, droughts are one of the main  
 
causes of desertification and desert encroachment when accompanied by inappropriate resource  
 
practices. It is also projected that climate change will exacerbate drought implications and  
 
negative impacts on the economies of Arab countries.
19
  
 
 
III. Agriculture and Food security  
 
With no rivers, one of the world's lowest levels of rainfall, and a harsh desert  
 
environment, Qatar's agricultural resources are very limited. The country has a land area of  
 
11,590 square kilometers, of which only 1.1 percent is arable. Qatar's population has also  
 
                                                 
19 Ahmad Fares Asfary, Mohhamad S. Abido. (2005). Chapter 3-Land Resources. In The Environment Outlook for 
the Arab Region: Environment for Development and Human Well-Being. Center for Environment and Development 
in the Arab Region, p. 3. http://eoar.cedare.int/report/EOAR_Chapter%203%20%28EN%29.pdf.  
 
65 
 
increased 300 percent, from 500,000 people in 1995 to 2 million people in 2014. With an  
 
expanding population, an unfavorable climate and a decline of natural resources, it is apparent  
 
that Qatar’s domestic agricultural production needs improvement and Qatar needs to preserve its  
 
reserves of food and water.
20
 
 
Although Qatar has been working to improve its agriculture sector through the  
 
implementation of new technologies, Qatar imports 90 percent of its food, and there is still a  
 
serious concern that food availability may be jeopardized by declines in global agricultural  
 
productivity.
21
 Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 5.4 on the following page, Maplecroft  
 
categorized Qatar at an “extreme risk’ in regards to water availability and it was ranked 2nd in the  
 
world in water stress in 2012.
22
 While Qatar has had the financial means to combat these  
 
grievances, average temperatures are only expected to rise, which may increase the chances of  
 
severe droughts and soil evaporation rates in the future. Moreover, the change in rainfall amount  
 
and patterns will be erratic and precipitation will increase in high latitudes. Equally, extreme  
 
precipitation events are predicted to increase as well, and there will be higher soil erosion rates  
 
and lower soil moisture. Overall, projected global warming will be extremely harmful to Qatar’s  
 
crop production, agriculture yields and food security.
23
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 ‘Qatar's Journey to Self-Sufficiency: An Interview With Fahad Bin Mohammed Al-Attiya, Chairman of the Qatar 
National Food Security Programme,” Journal of International Affairs, Columbia University. Global Food Security, 
Vol. 67, No. 2, (Spring/Summer 2014):159-163.   
21 Doha News Team, “- Doha News.” (June 30, 2013), Doha News, accessed on October 9, 2014. 
http://dohanews.co/they-hassad-food-are-doing-some-revolutionary/.  
22
 “Maplecroft | Unsustainable Water Use Threatens Agriculture, Business and Populations Global Study.” 
Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics (May 10, 2012), https://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-
analysis/2012/05/10/unsustainable-water-use-threatens-agriculture-business-and-populations-china-india-pakistan-
south-africa-and-usa-global-study/.  
23 Nadim Farajalla, “Climate Change and the Environment in the Arab World Program,” Issam Fares Institute for 
Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, p. 40, accessed on October 11, 2014,  
 http://www.usp.br/nereus/wp-content/uploads/Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-the-Arab-World.pdf.  
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Figure 5.4: Qatar Rated 2
nd
 in the World for Extreme Risk of Water Availability. 
 
 
 
     Source- Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics (2012).  
 
 
IV. Health  
 
Increasing temperatures, changes in the distribution and behavior of diseases, and  
 
concentrations of air pollutants stemming from climate change have posed major health risks  
 
to the people living in Qatar. Many suffer and die from non-communicable diseases, such as  
 
cardiovascular diseases, hypertension, diabetes and cancer, and the sharp rise in poor air quality  
 
has posed serious risks for some, especially those with heart problems and asthma as well as the  
 
elderly and the very young.
24
 According to The World Health Organization (WHO), data from  
 
2012 indicates that the air in Doha, the capital of Qatar, is some of the most polluted in the  
 
world. Research concluded that Doha had the 12th highest average levels (93 ug/m3) of  
 
                                                 
24 “QSA: Harmful Air Particles Continue to Surpass Acceptable Limits in Qatar - Doha News.” Doha News Team, 
(March 2, 2013) ; “Air Quality Deteriorating in Many of the World’s Cities.” World Health Organization, (May 7, 
2014).  
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Particulate Matter (PM) 2.5 – small and fine particles, which are particularly dangerous to the  
 
health of those living there. Al Wakrah, another city in Qatar, had average levels (85 ug/m3) of  
 
PM2.5, which ranked 25th on the same list.
25
  
  
 Moreover, in 2011, the Qatar Statistics Authority reported that more than double the  
 
amount of the PM10 air pollutant was present in Doha (See Figure 5.6), which is another air  
 
pollutant that is hazardous to one’s health. The concentration of particles in the air ranged from  
 
105 to 185 micrograms per cubic meter at various spots around Doha. The annual recommended  
 
limit is 50. 
 
  Figure 5.5: Air Quality in Doha, Qatar in 2011 
       
 
 
Source- Qatar’s Statistics Authority (2013). 
 
The deteriorating air quality has jeopardized the health of all people living in Qatar.  
 
When the polluted air is inhaled, it could potentially damage internal organs, which could lead to  
 
lung disease and other respiratory issues. PM2.5 particles can penetrate the respiratory tract, and  
 
increase the risk of respiratory infections, lung cancer, heart disease and stroke. According to the  
 
US Environment Protection Agency, these particles – which you often cannot see with the naked  
 
                                                 
25 Victoria Scott, “WHO: Doha Ranked Among the World’s Most Polluted Cities” Doha News, (May 9, 2014). 
 
 
68 
 
eye – are made up of heavy metals and toxic organic compounds, and their sources are usually  
 
car exhausts, smelting plants and the burning of organic materials. 
 
Qatar has seen pollution increase over the past several years, with one government report  
 
citing the sand and dust created by the manufacturing industry and the soaring number of  
 
construction projects, as well as increasing road congestion, as the main issues.
26
 Moreover,  
 
potential future climatic events could cause related deaths, injuries, infectious diseases, and  
 
stress.
27
 According to Nadim Farajalla, from the American University of Beirut in a  
 
paper on the Impact of Climate Change on the Arab World, other health related disorders,  
 
stemming from climate change, may arise in Qatar, including sensitive and infectious diseases  
 
such as malaria, dengue fever, yellow fever, and encephalitis.
28
 
 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), Qatar possesses high quality health  
 
care, even by the standards of the industrialized countries. Life expectancy has risen sharply as  
 
health care provision has improved. However, there is a need to strengthen Qatar’s health  
 
system, as a lack of clarity exists between different stakeholders regarding health policy analysis,  
 
strategic health planning, priority-setting, and coordination for monitoring and assessing health  
 
risks such as those which stem from climate change.
29
 Furthermore, the World Bank notes that as  
 
climate change continues, the national health ministries in Arab countries would benefit in  
 
addressing the health effects of climate change by employing and authorizing climate change  
 
specialists to help guarantee the sustainability of governmental efforts to adopt climate change  
 
adaptation strategies.
30
  
                                                 
26 Victoria Scott, “WHO: Doha Ranked Among the World’s Most Polluted Cities.”  
27 Nadim Farajalla, “Climate Change and the Environment in the Arab World Program,” p. 39. 
28 Ibid. 
29 “Country Cooperation Strategy for WHO and Qatar 2005–2009,”World Health Organization, Regional Office for 
the Eastern Mediterranean, (2006), p. 7, accessed on August 1, 2014. 
http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccs_qat_en.pdf?ua=1. 
30 Dorte Verner ed. 2012. MENA Development Report, Adaptation to a Changing Climate in the Arab Countries. 
Washington DC: World Bank. (2012), p. 328.  
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Qatar’s Approach to Climate Change 
 
 Although Qatar attended negotiations on the environment as early as 1992, at the UN  
 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), (also known as the Earth Summit) in  
 
Rio, Brazil, its presence in the international climate change negotiations was rather minor up  
 
until 2011. In that year, Qatar’s representatives first spoke out at the 2011 United  
 
Nations High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly to Address Desertification, Land  
 
Degradation and Drought in the Context of Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication.    
 
Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, who was President of the United Nations General Assembly and  
 
former permanent representative of Qatar to the UN, spoke at the meeting, where he publicly  
 
acknowledged the threat of climate change to the Middle East and East Africa. He spoke about  
 
the drastic effects of climate change on these two regions, which included extreme droughts and  
 
the food crisis, noting that, “The economic, social and human cost of desertification is  
 
tremendous. This is the most severe food crisis in the world today.”31 Urging an intensive global  
 
response, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser called on States to take immediate, decisive action to  
 
address the impact of climate change.
32
   
 
 In the context of sustainable development, it may be important to mention that Qatar is a  
 
member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which is a  
 
permanent intergovernmental organization of 12 oil-exporting developing nations. Oil producing  
 
nations are high carbon emitters, and are under international pressure to reduce their emissions.  
 
Although Qatar did not attend all of the climate change negotiations, OPEC was represented at  
 
the Earth Summit in Rio, Brazil as well as negotiations in Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban, Doha  
 
and Warsaw. OPEC countries have tended to resist demands for emissions reduction. 
                                                 
31 “Programme of the 2011 High-Level Meeting on Addressing Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought.” 
United Nations, accessed on October 10, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/desertification2011/plenary.shtml.  
32 Ibid. 
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Qatar is a member of the “Great Green Wall Initiative,” a pan-African proposal to 
 
“green” the continent from west to east in order to battle land desertification. At the national  
 
level, food security is also a major issue. A master plan was developed in 2008 by His Highness  
 
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa A1 Thani, the Emir of the State of Qatar at the time, to ensure that  
 
Qatar would develop a state of food security by 2025. Part of this reform was a plan, known as  
 
the Qatar National Food Security Programme (QNFSP), which Qatar implemented to reform the  
 
energy, water, agriculture, and food sectors of Qatar. According to the QNFSP, Qatar recognized  
 
that its farming system needed to be upgraded so a stable water supply could be available. The  
 
Programme also outlined the need for efficient and advanced technologies to minimize the waste  
 
of food and water and to increase productivity.
33
 Extending its approval externally, Qatar urged  
 
the creation of the “Global Dryland Alliance,” a 2012 initiative which aimed at tackling food  
 
insecurity. The QNFSP noted that countries like Qatar, which faced the challenge of food  
 
insecurity, wanted to take collective actions to improve prevention of and response to food  
 
security crises. This included investing heavily in new food security solutions.
34
  
 
 In the lead up to the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway, Qatari nationals and visitors to Doha,  
 
brought together by their common concern for the environment, took to the city to march for  
 
sustainability. The procession, which was organized by Doha Oasis—a grassroot organization  
 
from Qatar which focuses on the environment and health through awareness, actions and  
 
community outreach
35— received praise from Fahad Bin Mohammed Al-Attiya, chairman of  
 
the Qatar National Food Security Programme, for demonstrating Qatar’s national commitment to  
 
                                                 
33“National Food Security Program” Hukoomi - Qatar E-Government,, accessed on October18, 2014. 
http://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/topics/environment%20and%20natural%20resources/national%20food%20sec
urity%20program/  
34  “Qatar Calls for Launch of Global Dry Land Alliance in 2012 | PRLog.”PRLog Press Release Distribution, 
(March 9, 2012), http://www.prlog.org/11818856-qatar-calls-for-launch-of-global-dry-land-alliance-in-2012.html.  
35 “Doha Oasis.” Doha Oasis, accessed on October 10, 2014, http://www.dohaoasis.org/about.php.  
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the environment.  At a time when Qatar was growing rapidly economically, both the march and  
 
Qatar’s hosting of the Doha Climate Gateway illustrated Qatar’s heightened commitment to  
 
protecting the environment as well as its ability to raise awareness of environmental  
 
sustainability throughout the Middle East.
36
 
 
 Also at this time, representatives from the Qatari government, Qatar Petroleum, and the  
 
World Bank, signed an Administrative Agreement for Qatar’s participation in phase 4 of the  
 
Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) partnership, an initiative which covers the period  
 
between 2013 to 2015 and aims to reduce the flaring of gas associated with oil and gas  
 
production in an effort to improve Qatar’s energy efficiency and reduce GHG emissions.37 This  
 
includes implementing a number of gas flaring reduction projects in various oil fields and mega  
 
gas plants in the country. While the oil and gas production in Qatar has increased fourfold, Qatar  
 
has been able to halve gas flaring. It flared nine cubic meters of gas per barrel of oil equivalent  
 
(boe) produced in 2000, as compared to just 1.1 m3 per boe in 2011.
38
 Additionally, Qatar’s  
 
permanent constitution, which was ratified in 2004 and came into effect in June 2005,
39
 had  
 
already made this commitment, stating that “The State shall preserve the environment and its  
 
natural balance in order to achieve comprehensive and sustainable development for all  
 
generations.”40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 “Council News-COP 18 in Doha.” (2012), US-QATAR Business Council, accessed on November 8, 2014, 
http://www.usqbc.org/news-detail.php?newsid=243.  
37 “Global Gas Flaring Reduction - Qatar, World Bank Extend Cooperation to Further Reduce Emissions from Gas 
Flaring.” (December 6, 2012), the World Bank. 
38 Ibid. 
39 “Qatar National Vision 2030.” General Secretariat for Development Planning, (2008), p. 5, 
http://www.gsdp.gov.qa/portal/page/portal/gsdp_en/qatar_national_vision/qnv_2030_document.  
40 Ibid. p. 34.  
72 
 
Qatar’s Role in the Negotiations: Delegate Representation 
 
Qatar’s total number of delegates (266) and high-level delegation (80) is inflated by the  
fact that Qatar hosted the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway. As a result, I have given Qatar a dummy  
variable for this conference (32), which is equivalent to the average number of  Qatar’s  
delegates at the other four conferences. For this conference the number of high-level delegates  
was also changed to an average of the four conferences. Therefore, Qatar has a new total number  
of 160 delegates and 30 high-level delegates at the five climate change negotiations from 2009- 
2013.  
By looking at the Average Number of Delegates (AND) from Singapore, Norway and  
Switzerland at these negotiations, which are similar countries in terms of population and wealth,  
I have compared Qatar’s Delegation Count (DC) to the AND to see how Qatar ranks in terms of  
its representation at the negotiations (See Table 5.1). Singapore sent 208 delegates, Norway sent  
320 delegates, and Switzerland sent 141 delegates. As the Table illustrates, the AND of 
Singapore, Norway and Switzerland is 223. According to the benchmark, since Qatar’s DC is  
160 delegates, which is less than the AND-10, Qatar ranks below the average representation and  
has earned two points as a result. 
 
Table 5.1: Points for Delegate Representation in 2009-2013 Climate Change Negotiations 
 
Benchmark: 
DC is 25+ AND=country has above average representation (10 Points) 
DC is 10-25 more than AND=(8 points) 
DC is AND +/- 10= country has average representation (5 Points) 
DC is less than AND-10= country has below average representation (2 Points)  
 
Average Number of 
Delegates (AND): 
223 
Qatar’s Total 
Delegate Count 
(DC):160 
Benchmark: 
DC less than AND-10 
Points Earned: 2 
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In order to determine overall involvement, I have included the two points earned for  
 
Qatar’s delegate representation in Table 6.2 below.  
 
 
Qatar’s Role in the Negotiations: Determining Involvement 
 
Table 6.2: Determining Involvement 
Number of 
times for 
Attendance at 
Negotiations:5  
 
Other 
Relevant 
Sessions: 1 
Number of 
Points for 
Delegate 
Representation 
at Negotiations: 
2 points 
Number of 
High-Level 
Delegates: 
32 (20%)- 
*10 points 
Number 
of times 
Qatar 
Spoke: 7 
Number of 
times Qatar 
Presented a 
Proposal: 3 
Did Qatar 
Lead, 
Advocate 
or Sponsor 
for Other 
Developing 
Countries? 
Yes= 4 
points  
Total 
Amount 
of Points: 
32 
*To see the scale of percentage ranges and points, refer to chapter 2.  
 
41-50 points A+ grade 
31-40 points A grade 
21-30 points B grade 
11-20 points C grade 
 0-10 points D grade 
 
As shown in Table 6.2, Qatar attended all five negotiations on climate change and one  
 
special session, the 2011 United Nations High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly to  
 
Address Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought, to get a combined score of six points.  
 
As previously noted, with the dummy variable assigned, Qatar received two points for its  
 
delegate representation as a result of its 160-member delegation and it received 10 points for  
 
sending 32 high-level delegates. As a result, Qatar ranks below the average representation when  
 
compared to similar countries. Qatar’s high-level delegation included: The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh  
 
Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani; Abdullah Bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, the President of the conference  
 
and Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar at the time; and His Excellency Dr. Mohammed bin Saleh  
74 
 
 
Al-Sada, Minister of Energy and Industry and Chairman & Managing Director of Qatar  
 
Petroleum.
41
 Qatar spoke seven times, presented three proposals, and led and advocated on  
 
behalf of other developing countries. In total, Qatar received 32 points, or a low A grade, which  
 
indicates moderately high participation. This grade reflects the fact that as a whole, Qatar—a  
 
hydro-carbon economy—has only recently shown interest in becoming involved in  
 
environmental matters. As climate change poses serious risks for the future, Qatar has recently  
 
begun to take the dangers of climate change more seriously. As already described, the country  
 
has started to implement green technologies to strengthen sustainability efforts and  
 
has prioritized the environment as a chief concern. 
 
 
I. Proposals 
 
 At the Doha Climate Gateway and the Warsaw talks, Qatar presented three 
 
proposals/statements that stood out: 
 
(1) At Doha, Qatar proposed to extend the Kyoto Protocol until 2020. The Kyoto 
Protocol obliged 35 industrialized nations to cut GHG emissions by an average of at least 
5.2 percent below 1992 levels during the period from 2008 to 2012. Within this proposal, 
Qatar also offered possible ways to meet developing countries demands for a new 
mechanism, including insurance, to help them confront losses and damage caused by the 
increase in sea levels and storms linked to climate change.
42
 
(2) At Doha, Qatar, with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
submitted plans for economic diversification which served as nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions and highlighted Qatar’s efforts to reduce GHG emissions and adopt 
renewable energy within the Middle East.
43
  
                                                 
41 “Climate Action Sustainable Innovation Forum,” Sustainable Innovation Forum 2012, accessed on October 19, 
2014, http://www.cop18qatar.com/.  
42 “UPDATE 2-Weak Plan to Save Kyoto Pushes Climate Talks to Brink,” Reuters News Agency, (December 8, 
2012). 
43 “Summary and Analysis of the Doha Climate Change Conference - November 2012” 26 November - 7 December 
2012, Doha, Qatar.” International Institute for Sustainable Development, accessed on October 10, 2014, 
http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12567e.html.  
75 
 
(3) At Doha, Qatar called upon developed countries to fulfill their international 
obligations in regards to extending assistance to developing countries.
44
  
 
II. An Advocate for Other Countries  
 
 As previously mentioned, at the 2011 United Nations High-Level Meeting of the  
 
General Assembly to Address Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought in the Context of  
 
Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser advocated for  
 
both the Middle East and East Africa, pointing out that the regions were experiencing its worst  
 
drought in 60 years. He said that in the past three months alone, famine had claimed the lives of  
 
tens of thousands of Somali children under the age of five and forced people from their  
 
communities. He further stressed that major policy interventions in sustainable land-management  
 
strategies would be needed to alleviate these challenges, such as moving towards an ambitious  
 
quantitative target. In addition, he insisted that policies and technologies must be designed to  
 
promote the sustainable use of resources and foreseeable financial support for domestic efforts.
45
  
 
Furthermore, at the 2011 Durban Conference, Qatar expressed its eagerness to support the  
 
endeavors of developing countries, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS), in adapting  
 
to the inevitable effects of climate change.
46
 
 
At the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway, Qatar represented the Middle East in its  
 
quest to embark on environmental efforts. It also drew international attention to what the  
 
Middle East could do for climate change mitigation and environmental sustainability within the  
 
region and on a global scale. Although Qatar is one of the world’s highest energy users per  
 
capita, the country wanted the international community to know that it has taken concrete steps  
                                                 
44 “The Address of His High Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani Amir of the State of Qatar at the 18th 
Session of the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.” United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (December 4, 2012), p. 2.  
45 “2011 High Level Meeting on Addressing Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought in the Context of 
Achieving Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication” United Nations, accessed on November 13, 2014, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/desertification2011/plenary.shtml.  
46 “Press Release-Decision on the Host of COP18/CMP 8,” United Nations, (November 29, 2011), p. 1. 
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to limit its waste and create a sustainable future, and the conference demonstrated the country’s  
 
commitment to fulfilling these goals.
47
 
  
In terms of supporting developing countries, Qatar, through the GGFR partnership,  
 
agreed to assist other developing countries with gas flaring reduction by improving their gas  
 
infrastructure and gas markets, as a way to expand access to cleaner electricity and cooking  
 
fuels.
48
 Qatar has also been a member of the Adaptation fund, which provides finance for  
 
adaption projects and programs to developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the  
 
adverse effects of climate change.
49
 Overall, I gave Qatar 4 points for advocating for the Middle  
 
East, Africa, developing countries, and small island developing states. 
 
 
Reasons for Performance 
 
Vulnerability and Performance 
 
 Given the fact that Qatar ranks relatively low on Maplecroft’s CCVI, (See Chapter 4- 
 
Figure 4.3), why would Qatar take even a moderately active role in the negotiations? Of  
 
course, Qatar has realized that climate change vulnerability is happening. Qatar is beginning to  
 
be involved because they are becoming more vulnerable and its involvement since 2012  
 
indicates that it wants to be more active in the future. In addition, Qatar can see that other  
 
countries are becoming more vulnerable, particularly its regional neighbors, such as the United  
 
Arab Emirates, which has also begun to experience similar challenges to its water resources and  
 
dryland ecosystems as a result of climate change.
50
  
                                                 
47 “Council News-COP 18 in Doha.” (2012), US-QATAR Business Council, accessed on November 8, 2014,  
http://www.usqbc.org/news-detail.php?newsid=243.  
48 Ibid.  
49 “About the Adaptation Fund.” The Adaptation Fund, accessed on November 8, 2014, https://www.adaptation-
fund.org/about.  
50 “The United Arab Emirates Initial National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change” Ministry of Energy United Arab Emirates, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, (2006) p. 36, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/arenc1.pdf.  
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Other Factors: 
 
Aid and Performance 
 
Although Qatar is beginning to face environmental challenges that need to be properly  
 
resolved, such as achieving water security, reducing carbon emissions, and increasing energy  
 
efficiency,
51
 Qatar is a very wealthy country and has had the financial means to combat climate  
 
change issues. As previously mentioned, Qatar is classified by the World Bank as a high-income  
 
country.
52
 Thus, its participation in the recent climate change negotiations was not a result of its  
 
desire for outside financial aid for environmental assistance. As opposed to some low income  
 
countries like Kenya, which regularly advocated for outside financial assistance for  
 
environmental mitigation and adaptation (as discussed in Chapter 4), Qatar has not needed  
 
outside financial aid for environmental assistance. In fact, as a financially stable country,  
 
Qatar has assisted other developing countries by providing finance for climate change mitigation  
 
and adaptation. As previously discussed, this has been evidenced through its GFFR partnership  
 
and its membership in the Adaptation fund.  Furthermore, throughout the negotiations, Qatar did  
 
not communicate to parties that funding was a chief concern. Instead, Qatar’s stance centered  
 
more on its domestic objectives, which included evaluating the severity of climate change risks,  
 
reducing its carbon footprint, and putting appropriate policy and governing frameworks in place  
 
to deal with expected changes from climate change. Overall, financial aid for the environment  
 
was not an issue for Qatar and therefore it had no effect on its level of performance.  
 
Prestige and Regional Leadership 
In the recent years, Qatar has frequently and successfully applied to host international  
                                                 
51 General Secretariat for Development Planning, “Advancing Sustainable Development” Qatar National Vision 
2030 Second National Human Development Report (2009). p. iii, 
]http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Qatar/Qatar_HDR_2009_English.pdf.  
52 “Data-Qatar” The World Bank, accessed November 12, 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/country/qatar#cp_cc.  
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conferences and events. According to Guido Steinberg, Qatar showed interest in hosting the  
 
climate change negotiation not necessarily because of concern about climate issues, but for the  
 
purpose of raising its international profile.
53
 Qatar has had aspirations to be a regional leader.  
 
Tamim bin Khalifa al-Thani, Emir of Qatar, has promoted Qatar in the region, and one way to  
 
increase Qatar’s prominence is by holding conferences, taking initiatives and attempting to insert  
 
Qatar into as many regional and international power structures as possible.
54
  
 
With that said, Qatar’s quest to become a regional leader has largely included its  
 
ambitions to become a front-runner in the environmental sphere. For example, as previously  
 
mentioned, Qatar joined in the GGFR partnership with the World Bank in 2009. Notably, it 
 
was the first member of the regional grouping, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), to join the  
 
GGFR.
55
 Kuwait and Iraq later joined the partnership and followed in Qatar’s lead to join the  
 
global efforts to reduce flaring and increase the utilization of associated gas for power  
 
generation and other potential uses.
56
 Moreover, Qatar’s National Development Strategy 2011- 
 
2016 outlines a plan for Qatar to emerge as a regional or global leader in environmental  
 
technologies and applications. According to this plan, Qatar’s strategy for improved  
 
environmental management involves working towards seven outcomes:  
 
Cleaner water and sustainable use; cleaner air and effective climate change  
responses; reduced waste, more recycling and more efficient use; nature and natural 
heritage conservation, protection and sustainable management; more sustainable 
urbanization and a healthier living environment; an increasingly environmentally aware 
                                                 
53 Andrea Rönsberg. “Climate Offender Qatar Hosts the World | Environment.” Deutsche Welle. (November 25, 
2012).  
54 Andrew Hammond “Qatar’s Leadership Transition: Like Father, Like Son,” Policy Brief. London, United 
Kingdom: European Council on Foreign Relations. p. 1, accessed on November 11, 2014, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR95_QATAR_BRIEF_AW.pdf.    
55 “News & Broadcast - Qatar: First Gulf Country Joins World Bank-Led Effort to Reduce Greenhouse Emissions 
from Gas Flaring.” The World Bank, (January 25, 2009). 
56 “News & Broadcast-Qatar, World Bank Extend Cooperation to Further Reduce Emissions from Gas Flaring” The 
World Bank, (March 4, 2014). 
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population; improved governance and regional and international cooperation.
57
 (My 
emphasis). 
 
 
International Pressure to Reduce Emissions 
 
 In addition to the factors above, Qatar has had to deal with international pressure.  
 
International concern to combat global warming has grown over the past years. This is evident in  
 
the global Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and international institutions that have  
 
been formed in an effort to combat climate change. In addition, due to the increasing  
 
environmental challenges that countries around the world have faced, there has been an  
 
emergence of a general public awareness regarding global action to address environmental  
 
issues.
58
 In order to mitigate climate change, countries must reduce carbon emissions. Qatar— 
 
one of the largest emitters in the world—has faced great international pressure in recent years  
 
from both developed and developing countries to reduce carbon emissions and implement safer,  
 
greener technologies. For instance, after the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, developed countries like  
 
the United States urged other industrializing nations like Qatar to reduce GHG emissions.
59
 In  
 
addition, throughout all of the negotiations, other developing countries have been consistently  
 
pressing for wealthier nations to reduce GHG emissions. Also, after Qatar had been picked  
 
to host the 2012 U.N. Climate Summit, it came under intense public criticism for its high CO2  
 
emissions. As a result, countries were wary about Qatar hosting a climate conference.
60
  
 
Qatar has also faced pressure from global institutions such as United Nations as well as  
 
environmental NGOs like CAN International, a global network of over seven hundred NGOs.  
                                                 
57 “Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016” Qatar General Secretariat for Development Planning, 
(March,  2011) p. 23.  
58 Nicholas Robinson and Lal Kurukulasuriya “Training Manual of International Environmental Law” Pace 
University School of Law, (2006),  p. 1, accessed on December 8, 2014,  
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1789&context=lawfaculty.  
59 Juliet Eilperin and Anthony Faiola. “U.S. Pledges Aid, Urges Developing Nations to Cut Emissions.” The 
Washington Post, (December 18, 2009). 
60 Stephen Leahy, “Deep Emissions Cuts Urged at Climate Summit” Inter Press Service News Agency, (2012). 
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For example, just days before the 2012 Doha conference, the United Nations Environment  
 
Program (UNEP) released an emissions gap report, which was conducted by fifty-five scientists  
 
from more than twenty countries. The report showed that greenhouse gas (GHG) levels were  
 
around 14 percent above what they need to be in 2020. UNEP further stressed that “Action to  
 
combat climate chance needs to be urgently scaled up if the world is to have any chance of  
 
keeping the temperature rise below two degrees Celsius.”61 As a result, during the Doha Climate  
 
Gateway, Qatar and President of the Conference, His Excellency Abdullah bin Hamad Al- 
 
Attiyah, faced criticism and pressure from environmental NGOs to cut down emissions. Wael  
 
Hmaidan, Director of CAN International, stated, “Qatar and the COP president have yet to prove  
 
their leadership on the issue. This week, it is up to the president to prove to the world he takes  
 
climate change seriously. The best way would be to make a pledge for an emission reduction  
 
target for 2020.”62 Overall, Qatar, a country seen as controversial in respect to preserving the  
 
environment, has faced great international pressure to reduce emissions throughout the years. As  
 
a result, international pressure may have prompted it to be proactive in some of the recent  
 
international climate change negotiations.  
 
 
Spread of Norms 
 
 Because Qatar’s vulnerability to climate change has remained low, it is likely that Qatar’s  
 
active role in the negotiations and its desire to host the 2012 Climate Gateway in Doha was  
 
primarily driven by the spread of environmental norms throughout the international community.  
 
As climate change has grown to be a major international issue, governments throughout the  
 
world have united to come together, as demonstrated in the several international climate change  
                                                 
61 “UN Emission Report Puts Pressure on Doha Conference,” Dot by Dot. (November 21, 2012), 
http://www.dotbydot.co.uk/climate-change/245-un-emission-report-puts-pressure-on-doha-conference.  
 
62 Stephen Leahy “Deep Emissions Cuts Urged at Climate Summit,” (2012). 
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negotiations, to collectively act and form ideas, objectives and solutions to tackle the threats of  
 
climate change. Thus, this new global outlook on climate change and the universal need to pay  
 
more attention to preserving the environment have been translated into environmental beliefs and  
 
norms that have been reinforced through the international community. Overall, the global  
 
consensus, mutual support and action in respect to the environment have been reinforced through  
 
the international negotiations. Thus, it is likely that Qatar’s participation can be explained by a  
 
case of solidarity.  
 
Assessment 
 
 Some developing countries were not satisfied with the outcomes of the Doha Climate  
 
Gateway and the later Warsaw Talks. In regards to the former, some developing countries  
 
believed that the aftermath of the Doha Climate Gateway brought no substantial progress on  
 
ambitious international goals, nor did parties move meaningfully toward a new international  
 
agreement which must be negotiated by 2015. In this respect, reactions to the Doha Climate  
 
Gateway were mixed; while some parties were pleased with the results, others were not satisfied  
 
with the fact that countries had not agreed to speed up efforts to do more. Poorer developing  
 
countries simply felt that developed and advanced developing countries had not done enough to  
 
implement concrete climate protection goals. Specifically, they felt that industrialized countries  
 
like Qatar kept delaying these aims. In turn, poorer, developing countries were left deprived of  
 
substantial assistance. At the Doha Climate Gateway, advanced developing and developed  
 
countries did not meet the demands of poorer, developing countries which had requested a clear  
 
time-table for a promised tenfold increase in aid to $100 billion a year by 2020. Instead, the  
 
United States, Europe and other developed nations agreed to put off decisions to 2013.
63
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Furthermore, while Qatar was expected to steer 194 countries towards a new goal to reduce  
 
GHGs at the Doha Climate Gateway, it was difficult to ignore the fact that Qatar itself has been a  
 
gulf nation that has depended largely on oil and gas, and thus has significantly contributed to the   
 
problem.
64
  
  
On the other hand, Qatar’s contributions to climate change were well received by United  
 
Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, who praised Qatar and congratulated the Qatari  
 
government for its successful role in hosting the conference.
65
 Rachel Kyte, the World Bank’s  
 
Vice President for Sustainable Development also acknowledged Qatar’s efforts, stating, “Qatar’s  
 
support and concrete contributions to minimizing emissions from gas flaring are critical actions  
 
to help limit global warming.”66 She referred to the will of the GGFR partnership to reduce GHG  
 
emissions, noting that Qatar’s efforts had helped to reduce gas flaring by 20 percent, from 172  
 
billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2005 to 140 bcm in 2011, and the cut had prevented some 274  
 
million tons of CO2 emissions.
67
 
 
 Overall, Qatar’s performance in the context of the climate change negotiations has been 
 
somewhat mixed. However, it has had a positive effect on its neighbors. For example, the  
 
United Arab Emirates has begun to adopt similar policies in terms of implementing renewable  
 
energy and they have begun to understand the significant role oil and gas can play as a passage to  
 
a low-carbon, sustainable future. Furthermore, it is evident that momentum has gathered within  
 
the region to embrace renewable energy and invest in clean energy targets.
68
                                                 
64“Qatar Hosts Climate Summit Amid Criticism.” Aljazeera English News, (November 25, 2012). 
65 “Council News- Ban Ki-Moon Praises Qatar’s Leadership Efforts at COP-18.” 2012. US-Qatar Business Council, 
accessed on November 8, 2014, http://www.usqbc.org/news-detail.php?newsid=243.  
66 “Global Gas Flaring Reduction - Qatar, World Bank Extend Cooperation to Further Reduce Emissions from Gas 
Flaring,” The World Bank, (December 6, 2012). 
67 “World Bank Urges Oil Producers to Reduce Gas Flaring, Increase Gas Utilization for Development.” The World 
Bank, (October 24, 2012).  
68 “United Arab Emirates: Leading the Renewable Energy Charge.”Masdar, accessed on November 8, 2014, 
http://www.masdar.ae/en/home/detail/united-arab-emirates-leading-the-renewable-energy-charge.  
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CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDY-TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
 
 
Climate Change in Trinidad and Tobago 
    
 The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is an archipelagic state in the southern Caribbean,  
 
lying northeast of Venezuela, South America and south of Grenada in the Lesser Antilles. It  
 
shares maritime boundaries with Barbados to the northeast and Guyana to the southeast
1
 (see  
 
Figure 6.1). The country occupies an area of 5,128 square kilometers with a population of 1.3  
 
million people.
2
 The island of Trinidad is the larger and more populous of the two main  
 
islands; Tobago is much smaller, comprising about six percent of the total area and four percent  
 
of the population.
3
        
 
Figure 6.1: Map of Trinidad and Tobago 
 
 
     
Source- Placesbook.org, 2013.  
 
Trinidad and Tobago experiences two relatively distinct seasonal climatic types: (1)  
 
Tropical Maritime, which occurs from January to May with warm days and cool nights with  
 
                                                 
1 “Second National Communication of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change” Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, (2013), p. 6,  
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/ttonc2.pdf.  
2 “Trinidad and Tobago Country Profile” Adaptation Learning Mechanism, accessed on October 24, 2014, 
http://www.adaptationlearning.net/trinidad-and-tobago/profile.  
3 “Second National Communication” Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, p.6. 
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relatively low rainfall, and (2) Modified Moist Equatorial, which occurs from June to December  
 
with hot, humid temperatures and increased rainfall. Tobago, located north of the two islands,  
 
experiences more of a dry season while Trinidad experiences a wetter one.
4
  
 
According to the United Nations, the Caribbean has experienced some warming over past  
 
decades, as evidenced by increasing average annual maximum and minimum temperatures. The  
 
numbers of days with very hot temperatures are increasing, while the number of days and nights  
 
with very cold temperatures are decreasing. In addition, the average five-day rainfall has  
 
increased while the number of consecutive dry days have decreased.
5
 As illustrated in Figure 6.2,  
 
Trinidad and Tobago’s average high temperatures have increased greatly over time.6  
 
  
 Figure 6.2: Mean of Daily High Temperature in Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
 
Source: Berkeley Earth, 2014.  
 
 
Trinidad and Tobago’s Vulnerability to Climate Change 
 
As Trinidad and Tobago is part of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the  
 
Caribbean sub-region, the threat of climate change is even more severe as compared to other  
 
nations due to the biophysical and socio-economic characteristics of these countries which make  
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Subregional Headquarters for the 
Caribbean. The Economics of Climate Change in the Caribbean. Caribbean Development Report, (2011). p. 9. 
6 Berkeley Earth. “Regional Climate Change: Trinidad and Tobago.” Accessed November 3, 2014. 
http://berkeleyearth.lbl.gov/regions/trinidad-and-tobago.  
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them especially vulnerable to these impacts. This is a result of the geographic location of many  
 
SIDS countries, which are located in the hurricane belt.
7
  
  
 According to the 2012 Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI) produced by  
 
Maplecroft, (See Chapter 4-Figure 4.3), Trinidad and Tobago’s vulnerability to climate  
 
change is characterized as “high risk.” However, according to Trinidad and Tobago’s country  
 
profile, given the country’s relatively advanced industrial base and smaller reliance on tourism as  
 
a source of revenue, it could be said it is better placed to adapt to climate change than many of its  
 
Caribbean neighbors.
8
 Nonetheless, as identified by the government, Trinidad and Tobago’s  
 
coastal and marine resources, freshwater resources, forestry, land use and biodiversity are the  
 
most vulnerable areas to the impacts of climate change. Human health and human settlements are  
 
other vulnerable sectors as well. In addition, sensitive ecosystems, the agricultural and economic  
 
sectors, and sea-levels will continue to be negatively impacted by climate change.
 9
 These issues  
 
will be discussed in further detail in the following section.
 
 
 
 
I. Economy 
 
 According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Trinidad and Tobago is the largest  
 
producer of oil and gas in the Caribbean and its economy is dependent on its energy supplies.  
 
The oil and gas sector contributes 46 percent of the nation’s $27.14 billion GDP (2013 est.) and  
 
the poverty rate is below 17 percent.
 10
 The per capita income of the country is approximately  
 
US$18,864 per year.
11
 As the Inter-American Development Bank notes, Trinidad and  
 
                                                 
7 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Subregional Headquarters for the 
Caribbean. “The Economics of Climate Change in the Caribbean-Summary Report” (2011). p. 1. 
8 “Trinidad and Tobago Country Profile” Adaptation learning Mechanism.  
9  Ibid. 
10 “The World Factbook, Central America and Caribbean: Trinidad and Tobago.” Central Intelligence Agency, 
accessed on September 8, 2014, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html.     
11 “Trinidad and Tobago Country Profile,” Adaptation Learning Mechanism.   
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Tobago is largely reliant on producing oil and gas to fuel its economy, and as a result, it is a high  
 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions emitter. Thus, the country is presented with growing  
 
challenges of developing sustainability while ensuring economic growth. In response to these  
 
challenges, Trinidad and Tobago’s government has recognized the potential to take part in  
 
substantial greenhouse gas emissions reductions as part of its response to climate change and has  
 
identified the financial requirements to effectively address climate change issues and the  
 
importance of developing the policy framework to shift to a low carbon development path.
12
 
 
  
II. Sea-level 
  
 Significant sea-level rise is projected to occur in Trinidad and Tobago, which will cause  
 
 increased flooding, soil erosion, and loss of coastline and coastal amenities such as human  
 
settlements, wetlands, related ecosystem goods and services and coastal agricultural lands due to  
 
soil salinization.
13
 Furthermore, sea-level rise threatens a significant amount of the country’s  
 
biodiversity, as wetlands form the habitations of a diverse set of highly vulnerable species of  
 
plants and animals. As over ninety percent of the wetlands are less than five meters in elevation,  
 
these areas are very vulnerable to the effects of sea level rise.
14
 
 
 
III. Agriculture  
  
 Trinidad and Tobago’s agricultural sector is very vulnerable to changes in  
 
precipitation which stem from climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
 
(IPCC) mentions three consequences for Trinidad and Tobago’s agricultural sector: (1) Global  
 
warming will likely cause decreased crop yields and increased aridity of soils and decreased crop  
                                                 
12 “Trinidad and Tobago Will Integrate Climate Change to Its Development Agenda with IDB Loan,” Inter-
American Development Bank, (2011). 
13 “National Climate Change Policy” Environmental Management Authority, (July 2011) p. 9. 
14 “Trinidad and Tobago Country Profile,” Adaptation Learning Mechanism. 
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yields; (2) less irrigation water availability; and (3) the projected increase in sea level will likely  
 
destroy coastal areas and soils which will lead to decreased crop yields and limit the availability  
 
of land for agricultural production. In turn, these effects will cause a reduction in agricultural  
 
productivity and competitiveness, which will reduce economic opportunities for agricultural  
 
profit and investment.
15
 
 
IV. Water 
  
 Climate change has led to significant impacts on Trinidad and Tobago’s water supply.  
 
The government has noted that “While around 92 percent of the population has access to  
 
drinking water, water supply is only regularly available to around 26 percent.” 16 The remainder  
 
of those supplied only receive water on a limited weekly schedule.
17
 Furthermore, water-related  
 
diseases that have arisen as a result of climate change have had a damaging impact on the  
 
population. The government stated that, “Despite a high life expectancy (approaching 70 years)  
 
and a low infant mortality rate (2.4 per 1,000 births) [in Trinidad and Tobago], water-related  
 
diseases are still widespread and figure among the leading causes of mortality, which is  
 
indicative of low water and sanitation service levels.”18 Furthermore, the government describes  
 
the projected effects from climate change on the water sector: 
 
The projected decrease in precipitation and increase in temperature coupled with increasing 
demand  for  water  are  likely  to  place  significant  stresses  on  the  water  sector,  making  
it especially  vulnerable  to  the  impacts  of  climate  change.  Specifically, likely increases in 
evaporation and evapo-transpiration as well as reduced precipitation will affect groundwater 
recharge rates. Coastal aquifers and reservoirs located in coastal areas will be susceptible to 
salt-water intrusion and inundation.
19
   
 
                                                 
15 “National Climate Change Policy,” p. 8.  
16 “National Circumstances of Trinidad and Tobago-Second National Communication of the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.” Government of the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago, p. 69, accessed on November 23, 2014. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/ttonc2.pdf.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. pp. 69-70.   
19 Ibid. p. 66. 
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V. Health   
  
 Climate change has had a significant impact on health and will continue to do so in the  
 
future. The effects are summarized in Table 6.3 below: 
 
Table 6.3: Climate Change Effects on Health in Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Short Term             Long Term 
 Increased death/Injuries from heat waves. 
 Direct injury or death from flooding, 
landslides and hurricanes. 
 Increase in hunger and malnutrition from crop 
failure and increased food prices. 
 Increase in respiratory illnesses and mortality 
due to increased dust and ground-level ozone.  
 Increase in water-borne and vector-borne 
diseases, such as dengue fever (high risk). 
 Psychological Effects (anxiety, depression and 
stress.) 
 Increase in coronary diseases from decreased 
quality of life and resulting increased stress. 
 Trauma from permanent loss of homes from 
inundation through sea-level rise or increased 
seasonal flooding and landslides. 
 Physical conditions resulting from disease, 
water-scarcity and loss of food and shelter. 
 
Source- K. Kumarsingh and D.D. Chadee (2008). 
 
 
VI. Sensitive Ecosystems 
  
 As climate change will cause the increase in sea surface temperature, there will be a  
 
significant loss of natural coastal defenses and ecosystems such as coral reefs and fisheries.  
 
Moreover, the Caroni Basin area, located between the northern mountain range and the central  
 
range of Trinidad and Tobago, is considered to be highly vulnerable to climate change for the  
 
following three reasons: first, it is the most densely populated area of the country and has a  
 
significant concentration of biodiversity; second, the area is already under threat from poor land- 
 
use practices, including deforestation of the northern range that has caused flooding in the lower  
 
areas of the Basin, as well as siltation and a decline in water resources; third, increased carbon  
 
dioxide in the atmosphere dissolves in the ocean and results in a lower seawater pH which can be  
 
detrimental to the abundant fisheries that are in the country.
20
   
 
 
 
                                                 
20 “Trinidad and Tobago Country Profile,” Adaptation Learning Mechanism. 
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Trinidad and Tobago’s Approach to Climate Change 
 
According to its representatives, the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, as a signatory to  
 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto  
 
Protocol, has been committed to mitigating climate change.
21
 It is a part of the Alliance of Small  
 
Island States (AOSIS), which was formed in 1990 to represent the interests of SIDS in the  
 
international climate change negotiations.
22
 Furthermore, the country has recognized that as a  
 
SIDS, it is evident that it will be severely impacted by the adverse effects of climate change as a  
 
result of its inherent characteristics such as small land space, limited technical and technological  
 
capacity and limited financial capacity.
23
  
 
 Trinidad and Tobago first attended the UN Conference on Environment and  
 
Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992.  
 
At the Conference, the special case of small islands and coastal areas was highlighted in Agenda  
 
21, which is a plan of action for sustainable development that was adopted by the international  
 
community. As an essential outcome of the conference, Agenda 21 called for a future  
 
global conference on the sustainable development of SIDS.
24
  
 
Two years later, in 1994, the UN Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of  
 
SIDS was held in Barbados. The Conference, which Trinidad and Tobago attended, adopted the  
 
Barbados Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of SIDS (BPOA), a 14-point  
 
program that identifies priority areas and specific actions necessary for addressing the special  
                                                 
21 Second National Communication. (2013), p. 1. and Dr. Roodal Moonilal, “Trinidad and Tobago Climate Change 
Policy – Summary Statement,” Earth Conscious Magazine, (September 7, 2011). 
22 Carola Betzold. (2010). “‘Borrowing’ Power to Influence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate 
Change Regime, 1990-1997.” Political Studies Association, Politics, 30 (3): 131–48. p. 131. 
23 “The Honourable Roodal Moonilal at the High-Level Meeting on the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy 
for Further Implementation of the Programme of Action for Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing 
States” 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (2010), Permanent Mission of Trinidad and Tobago to 
the United Nations, p. 1,  http://www.sidsnet.org/msi_5/docs/hlr/statements/rt1/Trinidad_and_Tobago.pdf.  
24 “UN Conference on Environment and Development,” (June 1992), SIDS Net http://www.sidsnet.org/about-
sids/unced.  
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challenges faced by SIDS.
25
 The BPOA specifically highlights how the small size of small-island  
 
developing states means that development and environment are closely interrelated and  
 
interdependent.
26
 It also emphasized the special challenges and constraints that cause significant  
 
hindrance to the socio-economic development of SIDS, including small size and geographic  
 
isolation that prevent economies of scale.
27
 The Conference reaffirmed the principles and  
 
commitments to sustainable development embodied in Agenda 21 and translated these into  
 
specific policies, actions and measures to be taken at the national, regional and international  
 
levels.
28
  
 
 Trinidad and Tobago had recognized early on that when the UN discussed the  
 
environment, the vulnerability of SIDS was not included. It wasn’t until the 1994 Barbados  
 
Program of Action that the special needs of SIDS were really globally recognized. Trinidad and  
 
Tobago, a more powerful small island developing as compared to its Caribbean neighbors,  
 
emerged as a country that was eager to take on efforts to promote the idea that SIDS should be  
 
treated differently. In particular, as the BPOA highlighted the fact that SIDS face issues of  
 
economic vulnerability and poverty, Trinidad and Tobago played a large role thereafter—-as  
 
demonstrated in its involvement in the recent climate change negotiations— in promoting the  
 
idea that climate change poses unique challenges to the socio-economic development of SIDS,  
 
and as a result, the international community would have to pay special attention to SIDS in the  
 
environmental agenda so that they can achieve sustainable development. 
 
The government of Trinidad and Tobago has also begun to develop domestic initiatives  
 
                                                 
25 “Barbados Programme of Action (BPOA) | SIDSnet: Small Island Developing States Network.” (2014) SIDSnet, 
accessed November 9, 2014, http://www.sidsnet.org/about-sids/bpoa.  
26 “Report of The Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States-Barbados 
Programme of Action,” United Nations General Assembly, (1994), p. 7.  
27 “Barbados Programme of Action (BPOA) | SIDSnet: Small Island Developing States Network.” 
28 Ibid. 
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pertaining to climate change, such as outlined in the First National Communication to the  
 
UNFCCC in 2001 and a Second National Communication in 2008. While the First National  
 
Communication focuses on national circumstances, details the national inventory of GHGs, and  
 
provides statements on vulnerability and adaptation strategies, technology needs, and capacity  
 
building and research,
29
 the Second National Communication builds upon the first and  
 
additionally includes mitigation options, a collection and analysis of national inventory of  
 
GHGs, and recommendations for proper data collection and sharing, technology needs, and  
 
capacity building.
30
  
 
According to the Second Communication, since the initial National Communication was  
 
created, significant national policy developments have been carried out by the government of  
 
Trinidad and Tobago, including the 2006 National Environmental Policy (NEP), (A first NEP  
 
was laid in Parliament in 1998), the 2011 National Forest Policy and the 2011 National Climate  
 
Change Policy. While the National Forest Policy works to guide the sustainable management of  
 
Trinidad and Tobago’s natural forestry and wildlife resources in an effort to mitigate climate  
 
change and build climate resilience, the National Environment Policy and the Climate Change  
 
Policy serve as administrative and legislative frameworks for environmental management policy  
 
guidance in order to pursue a low-carbon development path.
31
 A major objective under this  
 
agenda has been to shift the economy away from its dependence on non- renewable resources  
 
and move towards implementing alternative, renewable energy sources. Trinidad and Tobago’s  
 
Manifesto 2010, its Medium Term Policy Framework (MTPF 2011-2014), and its 2012  
 
                                                 
29 “Initial National Communication of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change,” Environmental Management Authority, (2001), [Foreword] p. 3, accessed October 
5, 2014, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/ttonc1.pdf.  
30 Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, “Second National Communication,” p. 1.  
31 Ibid. pp. 2-3. 
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Sustainability Report demonstrate this aim.
32
 Additional evidence of this is illustrated through  
 
the development of a Solar Industrial Development Plan and the National Wind Resource  
 
Assessment Programme, which serve to promote the expansion and use of renewable energy  
 
resources and energy efficiency.
33
 
 
 
Trinidad and Tobago’s Role in the Negotiations: Delegate Representation 
 
Trinidad and Tobago had a total number of 31 delegates and 11 high-level delegates at  
the five climate change negotiations from 2009-2013, (not including other relevant sessions). By  
looking at the Average Number of Delegates (AND) from Uruguay, Jamaica and the Maldives at  
these negotiations, which are similar countries in terms of population and wealth, I have  
compared Trinidad and Tobago’s Delegation Count (DC) to the AND to see how Trinidad and  
Tobago ranks in terms of its representation at the negotiations (See Table 6.1). Uruguay sent 51  
delegates, Jamaica sent 32 delegates and the Maldives sent 77 delegates. As the Table illustrates,  
the AND of Uruguay, Jamaica, and the Maldives is 53. According to the benchmark, since  
Trinidad and Tobago’s DC is 31 delegates, which is more than ten points below average,  
Trinidad and Tobago ranks as having a below average representation and has earned two points  
as a result. 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 “Working for Sustainable Development in Trinidad and Tobago,” Ministry of Planning and the Economy, (June, 
2012),  pp. 1, 16. 
33 “Ministry of Energy and Energy Affairs | Wind Resource Assessment Programme (WRAP), Ministry of Energy 
and Energy Affairs, accessed on November 25, 2014, http://www.energy.gov.tt/our-business/alternative-
energy/wind-resource-assessment-programme-wrap/,  and “Ministry of Energy and Energy Affairs | Pilot Projects,” 
Ministry of Energy and Energy Affairs, accessed on November 25, 2014, http://www.energy.gov.tt/our-
business/alternative-energy/pilot-projects/.  
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Table 6.1: Points for Delegate Representation in 2009-2013 Climate Change Negotiations 
 
Benchmark: 
 DC is 25+ AND=country has above average representation (10 Points) 
DC is 10-25 more than AND=(8 points) 
DC is AND +/- 10= country has average representation (5 Points) 
DC is less than AND-10= country has below average representation (2 Points) 
 
Average Number of 
Delegates (AND): 53 
Total Delegate Count 
(DC): 31 
Benchmark: 
DC is less than AND-10 
Points Earned: 2 
 
       
 
In order to determine overall involvement, I have added the two points earned for  
Trinidad and Tobago’s delegate representation in Table 6.2 below.  
 
Trinidad and Tobago’s Role in the Negotiations: Determining Involvement 
 
Table 6.2: Determining Involvement 
 
Number of 
times for 
Attendance at 
Negotiations: 5  
Attendance at 
Other Special 
Sessions: 3 
Number of Points 
for Delegate 
Representation at 
Negotiations: 
2 points 
  
Number of 
high-level 
delegates: 
11 (35.5%)- 
*15 points 
Number 
of times 
Trinidad 
and 
Tobago 
Spoke: 6 
Number of 
times 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 
Presented a 
Proposal: 7 
Did Trinidad 
and Tobago 
Lead, 
Advocate or 
Sponsor for 
Other 
Developing 
Countries? 
Yes= 3 points  
Total 
Amount of 
Points: 41 
*Trinidad and Tobago’s high-level delegation percentage is just above the range for countries scoring twenty 
points. Its score has been modified to reflect this. To see the scale of percentage ranges and points, refer to 
chapter 2. 
41-50 points A+ grade 
31-40 points A grade 
21-30 points B grade 
11-20 points C grade 
 0-10 points D grade 
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According to Table 6.2, Trinidad and Tobago received a total of 41 points, or a low A  
plus level grade which illustrates exceptional participation in the climate change negotiations. In  
regards to the number of negotiations Trinidad and Tobago attended, it attended all five  
negotiations. In addition, it attended three special sessions: the 2013 opening of the second  
session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action; the 2013  
51
st
 Commission for Social Development Session; and the 2013 bilateral climate change talks  
with the European Union. Taken together, Trinidad and Tobago’s score for attendance is 8.  
As previously noted, Trinidad and Tobago received 2 points for its delegate representation  
as a result of its 31-member delegation, which ranks below the average level of representation  
when compared to other similar countries. Trinidad and Tobago also received 15 points for  
sending 11 high-level delegates. The delegation spoke six times, presented a proposal/statement  
seven times, and advocated for other countries to receive 3 extra points. Thus, in reference to the  
analysis, Trinidad and Tobago has been highly proactive and committed throughout all of the  
negotiations.  
Trinidad and Tobago used the negotiations as an opportunity to speak on behalf of small  
island developing states, emphasize its high vulnerability to climate change, and communicate to  
parties its ideas, needs and requests in respect to combating climate change. Some of Trinidad  
and Tobago’s notable high-level delegates included the following four key officials: (1) Dr.  
Roodal Moonilal, Minister of Housing and the Environment and chair of the Commonwealth,  
who attended the 2010 Cancun Conference; (2) Ramona Ramdial, Minister of State in the  
Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources, who attended the 2012 Doha Climate  
Gateway; (3) Charles Eden, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Trinidad and  
Tobago to the United Nations, who attended the 2013 51
st
 Commission for Social Development,  
and (4) Kishan Kumarsingh,  Head of Multilateral Environmental Agreements at the Ministry of  
the Environment, who attended all five negotiations.  
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I. Proposals 
 
Trinidad and Tobago, together with the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS),  
 
of which Trinidad and Tobago is a member, presented seven statements/proposals that stood out: 
 
(1) At Copenhagen, Trinidad and Tobago proposed to limit temperature increases to 
below 1.5 degrees Celsius.
34
 
(2) At Cancun, Trinidad and Tobago urged the rejection of the use of per capita 
emissions or any other metric as any basis for defining the obligations of countries to 
reduce their emissions, as they felt this method was unfair to small, energy-producing 
countries like Trinidad and Tobago. Instead, they felt absolute emissions provided a 
more just method and called for an agreement on meaningful mitigation actions by all 
countries and the historical responsibility of developed countries.
 35
   
(3) Also at Cancun, Trinidad and Tobago called for immediate action on adaptation, 
REDD, technology transfer, and the provision of financial resources.
36
 
(4) Furthermore, at Cancun, Trinidad and Tobago requested positive consideration of 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology, a technological solution which 
captures Co2 before it enters the atmosphere and stores it in suitable sinks for an 
extended period of time in order to mitigate emissions.
37
 
(5) At Durban, Trinidad and Tobago called for the increase in the global share of 
renewables in energy supply, noting that increasing from roughly 10% at present to 
15% by 2020 has the potential to significantly reduce the ‘ambition gap’.38 
(6) At Doha, Trinidad and Tobago requested clarity that the appropriate scope and scale 
of financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building will be available for 
developing country Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs).
39
 
40
 
(7) Also at Doha, Trinidad and Tobago called for significant emission reduction targets 
for developed countries, including more ambitious (NAMAs) by developing 
countries, with the goal to define an ambitious yet practically feasible and achievable 
GHG reduction objective in the near future.
41
    
 
 
 
                                                 
34“Press Conference by Alliance of Small Island States on Climate Change” United Nations, (2009). 
35 Statement made by the Honourable Doctor Roodal Moonilal, p. 3. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 “Submission from the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. (December 2, 2011), p. 4.  
39 “Closing the Ambition Gap: A Workplan For Survival-Bonn Climate Change Conference.” Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS), (2012), p. 9.  
40 According to the UNFCCC, “NAMAs refer to any action that reduces emissions in developing countries and is 
prepared under the umbrella of a national governmental initiative. They can be policies directed at transformational 
change within an economic sector, or actions across sectors for a broader national focus. NAMAs are supported and 
enabled by technology, financing, and capacity-building and are aimed at achieving a reduction in emissions relative 
to 'business as usual' emissions in 2020.” 
41 “Closing the Ambition Gap: A Workplan For Survival” p. 9.  
96 
 
II. An Advocate for Other Countries 
 
As presented in the following table (See Table 6.2), Trinidad and Tobago’s high-level  
 
delegation participated at the negotiations to not only advocate for itself but also for other  
 
developing countries that were vulnerable to climate change.  
 
 
Table 6.2: 
 
2010 Cancun Negotiation On behalf of AOSIS, Trinidad and Tobago urged for 
immediate action on adaptation, reducing emissions from 
deforestation in developing countries, loss and damage, 
technology transfer, and the provision of financial 
resources.42 
2013 Bilateral Talks With the European Union On behalf of other developing countries, Trinidad and 
Tobago urged parties to use the upcoming Warsaw talks 
as an opportunity to reach a legally binding agreement that 
would be applicable to all, so that developing countries 
would not continue to suffer the worst from climate 
change. 43 
The 2013 Warsaw Talks T&T’s Kishan Kumarsingh,  Head of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements at Ministry of the 
Environment, represented all developing countries by 
being appointed to co-chair at the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. 44 
The 51st Commission for Social Development, 
2013 
Eden Charles, the representative of T&T, spoke on behalf 
of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to reiterate its 
position that climate change was one of the principal 
challenges impeding efforts by SIDS to achieve their 
social development objectives. He pointed out that small 
islands could have their entire economies destroyed by a 
single weather event, which would worsen poverty, 
increase unemployment and destroy infrastructure. He 
also said that CARICOM Governments and institutions 
were continuing to develop strategies to help the region's 
people overcome social development challenges, 
highlighting that those efforts were obstructed by the 
failure of some development partners to live up to 
internationally agreed goals and objectives.45 
 
                                                 
42 Statement by the Honourable Doctor Roodal Moonilal, (2010), p.3.  
43 “Trinidad and Tobago and the European Union Hold High-level Talks on Climate Change” Caribbean Energy 
Information System, (2013).  
44 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, “CARICOM Leaders bid Farewell to Madiba” 
Inside Foreign Affairs, (2013), p. 3. 
45 Donn Bobb. “Climate Change One of the Main Challenges Impeding SIDS Efforts to Achieve Social 
Development Efforts: CARICOM | United Nations Radio.” (2013). 
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Thus, it is evident that throughout the recent climate change negotiations Trinidad and Tobago  
 
spoke for SIDS (AOSIS) as well as for CARICOM and developing countries as a whole (three  
 
points earned). 
 
 
Reasons for Trinidad and Tobago’s Good Performance 
 
 
Vulnerability and Performance 
 
As identified by Maplecroft’s CCVI, (See Chapter 4-Table 4.3), Trinidad and Tobago is  
 
highly vulnerable to climate change, and so it is likely that its high participation in the climate  
 
change negotiations could be attributed to its high vulnerability rate. This is shown through the  
 
fact that throughout the negotiations, Trinidad and Tobago emphasized its high vulnerability and  
 
stressed the need for the international community to put forward greater action in order to reduce  
 
harmful environmental effects. For instance, in 2013, at the opening of the second session of the  
 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), AOSIS delivered  
 
a statement citing the countries’ high vulnerability to climate change, and expressed concern  
 
over future climate change effects, such as stronger and more deadly tropical cyclones,  
 
prolonged droughts, biodiversity loss, and acceleration in sea level rise. Furthermore, as  
 
previously noted, Trinidad and Tobago, together with AOSIS, stressed that parties must achieve  
 
an ADP agreement that ultimately decreases CO2 concentrations to safe levels in order to limit  
 
warming to below 1.5 degrees by the end of the century.
46
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 “For Immediate Release: AOSIS Opening Statement ADP 2 | Alliance of Small Island States – AOSIS,” Alliance 
of Small Island States (April 29, 2013). 
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Other Factors: 
 
Aid and Performance 
 
Trinidad and Tobago has also been focused on gaining technical and financial support for  
 
climate change mitigation. While they said that they are fully committed to reducing GHGs and  
 
have implemented domestic adaptation programs and projects, they have stressed the need for  
 
technological and financial support from developed country partners in order to enhance their  
 
ability to address climate change issues. In fact, the country has secured funding, including loans  
 
from the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility (See Table 6.3) for adaptation  
 
programs and projects to be implemented in Trinidad and Tobago’s various sectors. While some  
 
loans have been secured for implementing sustainable development into Trinidad and Tobago’s  
 
ecosystem restoration, other loans have been secured for improving the energy sector and  
 
mainstreaming adaptation to climate change into a sustainable development agenda in Trinidad  
 
and Tobago and other Caribbean countries. 
 
 
Table 6.3: Environmental Assistance to Trinidad and Tobago and the Caribbean Region. 
(2003-Present) 
 
Funder/Partner Program Description Amount 
The World Bank/ 
Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) 
Nariva Ecosystem 
Restoration and Carbon 
Sequestration: Trinidad 
& Tobago (2009-2018) 
Restore and conserve the Nariva 
wetlands, through the recognition 
of the services it provides as a 
carbon sink and a biodiverse 
ecosystem. 
$4.60 
million 
GEF Energy for Sustainable 
Development in the 
Caribbean. (2010-
Ongoing.) 
Transfer and implement energy 
efficiency policies and 
instruments to the Caribbean 
countries to enable cost effective 
greenhouse gas emission 
reductions of 20 to 50 percent in 
the coming decades.  
$11.3 
million 
GEF Mainstreaming 
Adaptation  
to Climate Change:  
Caribbean Community  
(MACC). (2003-2009). 
Build regional capacity to collect 
and analyze data; build in-country 
capacity to formulate and analyze 
adaptation policy options and 
finalize sectoral adaptation 
strategies for participating 
countries; build capacity in 
$10.95 
million 
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preparation for a regional position 
for the UNFCCC; support public 
education and outreach programs 
by strengthening information 
access and data resources; and 
foster public awareness through 
technical assistance and capacity 
building. 
 
Sources: Global Environment Facility (2012); the World Bank (2014); and Adaptation Learning Mechanism (2009).  
 
 
Prestige and Performance 
 
Trinidad and Tobago played a significant role in the founding of AOSIS, as it wanted to  
 
create a unified group which would play a key role in the negotiations.
47
 Additionally, as climate  
 
change will be a long term problem, Trinidad and Tobago got involved in the negotiations  
 
because the government saw it as an opportunity to get on board early and bring small island  
 
states together. 
 
As Trinidad and Tobago is a wealthier small-island developing state, it has held a more  
 
powerful position as compared to its Caribbean neighbors. In this respect, Trinidad and Tobago  
 
could participate more in the climate change negotiations and serve as a spokesperson for the  
 
region. According to Ghallagher, it used the negotiations as an opportunity to demonstrate  
 
innovation, resilience and leadership on the issue.
48
 Also, since it had the financial means to  
 
adopt newer environmental technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, it assumed that  
 
other developing countries within the Caribbean and elsewhere could follow suit.
 49
  Ultimately,  
 
Trinidad and Tobago did not want to compromise the interests of vulnerable small island  
                                                 
47 “CARICOM Statement by H.E. Mr. Dennis Francis,” United Nations, (March 31, 2014), p. 2, 
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/8157caricom.pdf.  
48 Rajendra Ramlogan and Natalie Persadie, “The Inherent Conflict Between Sound Environmental Stewardship and 
Political Leadership in the Developing World: A Case Study of Trinidad and Tobago.” In Deborah Rigling 
Gallagher (Ed.), Environmental leadership: A reference handbook, Sage Publications, Inc., (2012): 558.  
49 Donnie Boodlal, Haydn I. Furlonge, Rachael Williams. “Trinidad and Tobago’s CO2 Inventory and Techno‐
economic Evaluation of Carbon Capture Options for Emission Mitigation.” The University of Trinidad and Tobago, 
(2008), p. 2.  
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developing states, and given the fact that the negotiations were resulting in limited progress and  
 
stalemates, Trinidad and Tobago specifically attended the negotiations out of self-interest. The  
 
country used the talks as an opportunity to focus on the needs of itself and other small-island  
 
developing states. 
 
Assessment 
 
Trinidad and Tobago’s high participation in the recent international climate  
 
change negotiations is likely due to the recognition of its high vulnerability to climate change, as  
 
my hypothesis proposes. The country says it has recognized the need to take action in fighting  
 
climate change and has developed domestic policies to counter environmental threats. However,  
 
despite its high level of participation, the country does have high emissions and has “excused”  
 
itself by asking for the non-use of per capita measures. Trinidad and Tobago’s high attendance  
 
can also be attributed to the need for outside assistance for climate change mitigation and  
 
adaptation.   
 
 In addition, although small island developing states like Trinidad and Tobago are very  
 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change, as they face threats such as significant sea-level rise,  
 
loss of agricultural lands and biodiversity loss, the concerns of these countries were buried in the  
 
environmental agenda. As previously mentioned, it wasn’t until the 1994 Barbados Programme  
 
of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States that the needs of  
 
these countries were globally recognized. A direct connection between environmentalism and  
 
sustainable development came out of this program, as nations agreed that in order to counter  
 
poverty and economic vulnerability in small island developing states, sustainable development  
 
was necessary. Furthermore, Trinidad and Tobago recognized early on that when the United  
 
Nations initially discussed the environment, the vulnerability of SIDS was not acknowledged. As  
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a result, Trinidad and Tobago took it upon themselves to promote the needs of SIDS at the  
 
negotiations and emphasized that these countries would have to be treated differently. To this  
 
end, Trinidad and Tobago has played a significant role in unifying small island states and serving  
 
as an environmental leader in its region. 
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CHAPTER 7-CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, I have explored the link between vulnerability and participation in  
 
international negotiations on climate change. I have chosen this topic due to the important and  
 
urgent nature of the climate change problem. Climate change has caused significant destruction  
 
to societies across the world and earth’s biodiversity. Furthermore, it continues to be a growing  
 
problem and no global plan to successfully combat climate change has been formulated by the  
 
international community. Moving forward, as the world continues to be plagued by climate  
 
change, it is imperative to take into account the necessary conditions for countries to be more  
 
open to negotiating, as only then will the global community be one step closer to achieving a  
 
successful united plan. Finally, it is vital to establish a global plan so the international  
 
community does not continue to face a variety of challenges which stem from climate change as  
 
well as to secure the health of the planet for future generations. 
 
In this thesis, I hypothesized that only when developing countries are able to observe the  
 
physical destruction of their environment and face challenges to adapt to new climatic conditions  
 
are they likely to become proactive in negotiations. I chose three developing countries for case  
 
study analysis: Kenya, Qatar, and Trinidad and Tobago. Kenya is large but economically  
 
disadvantaged, and extremely vulnerable as it faces major adverse impacts from climate change.  
 
It has been very active in environmental issues with respect to climate change negotiations and it  
 
has played an important role among African states. Qatar, a very wealthy but tiny nation, is  
 
ranked much lower in vulnerability although it is beginning to feel negative environmental  
 
impacts. As a hydro-carbon economy, it has been under pressure to reduce its carbon emissions.  
 
Until recently, it has not been very active in climate change negotiations but in 2012 it hosted the  
 
Doha Climate Gateway. Trinidad and Tobago is also small in size, an island, a hydro-carbon  
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economy, and highly vulnerable as it faces adverse impacts of climate change. 
 
The cases conform to the hypothesis: Kenya and Trinidad and Tobago both ranked  
 
as highly vulnerable on Maplecroft’s climate change vulnerability index and have been active in  
 
negotiations. Qatar has begun to see the effects of the changing climate and has started to get  
 
involved. However, the perception of vulnerability by itself does not mean that a country will be  
 
proactive. I found that countries might have been enticed by the prospect of financial aid as well.  
 
Although this was difficult to prove, Kenya’s constant plea for aid suggested that this was very  
 
crucial. Trinidad and Tobago also wanted aid to deal with the problem of small island developing  
 
states. More important to Qatar, however, was the international pressure it has faced to reduce  
 
emissions. Qatar has also been influenced to participate by the spread of environmental norms  
 
and the desire for inclusion. All three countries selected also seemed to be interested in  
 
prestige. This is particularly so for Kenya and Qatar. Both are playing important regional roles.  
 
This was less in the case for Trinidad and Tobago, although it did seem to want to lead small  
 
island developing states to some degree.  
 
Taken altogether, my findings reveal that along with feeling the impacts of climate  
 
change, other factors, such as financial aid for environmental assistance and sustainable  
 
development, self-interest, the spread of environmental norms, international pressure, and the  
 
desire for prestige and political leadership are all significant influences that are likely to play a  
 
part in motivating developing countries to be more proactive in climate change negotiations.  
 
Given the severity of climate change and the projection that it is likely to worsen, threats  
 
stemming from climate change will likely spread and become more prioritized by the  
 
international community. Thus, future studies should examine the motivations of a wide variety  
 
of states in becoming more involved in climate change negotiations.  
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